



DEMOCRACY & HUMAN RIGHTS

TOWARDS MORE AMBITIOUS GOALS

Reflections on the First International Migration
Review Forum

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Although context shaped content and process, lessons can be drawn from the format and substance of the first International Migration Review Forum (IMRF) process to inform future engagement.



The IMRF presents a new and valuable opportunity to pursue national, regional, and global advocacy through a set of additional entry points, but would be further strengthened if understood as a broad process rather than a single event.



This report contains factual reporting and reflections and recommendations from a civil society perspective, with a focus on enhancing promotion and protection of the human rights of all migrants regardless of status.

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Reflections on the First International Migration Review Forum



The inaugural IMRF succeeded in regard to several measures, especially against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, including securing political buy in from a broad range and large number of Members States and stakeholders and a consensus declaration on progress on a previously contested agreement (the Global Compact for Migration (GCM)). However, improvements are needed to reach its potential for delivering for migrants, in line with the promise in the GCM of people-centred and human rights-based migration governance. Learning from this IMRF process can help shape future strategy and identify resource needs to enable more effective participation.



The number and breadth of entry points for advocacy created by the IMRF process is a double-edged sword. Whilst online events without accreditation requirements help open and democratise space for civil society, the bigger and broader a process the more time and resources are needed to track openings and developments and to engage effectively. The approach of understanding the IMRF as a part of a broad process in coherence with the range of migration-relevant UN processes, rather than a single four-day event every four years, should be consolidated, but better communicated. The work to expand and democratise stakeholder space should be maintained and developed.



The modalities of the IMRF, combined with the breadth of the GCM, further widened by the inclusion in Members State interventions of issues that are adjacent to its scope, makes meaningful review of progress challenging. This undermines the potential of the IMRF to use review of State practice to incentivise implementation and identify areas for additional attention. While Member States' interventions and pledges provide openings for civil society monitoring and national level advocacy, addressing the underdevelopment of national and regional review and reporting should be a focus for future IMRF processes.

For further information on this topic:
<https://geneva.fes.de>

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PREFACE

»I believe that this cycle of International Migration Review Forums, Secretary General's reports and regional reviews, gives us the possibility but also the responsibility to work together towards more and more ambitious goals, and best possible migration governance worldwide, built on true dialogue and mutual respect.«

Statement by Finland, IMRF General Debate,
May 2022.¹

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), adopted in 2018, establishes a follow-up architecture that includes quadrennial review of progress through an International Migration Review Forum (IMRF), interspersed with reviews at the regional level. In this way the GCM created a new, flagship event for migration multilateralism, considerably expanding upon its closest predecessor, the High Level Dialogues on Migration and Development. The modalities were negotiated in 2019 and the inaugural IMRF was held in May 2022.

This paper will assess the processes at and leading up to this first IMRF from the perspective of civil society participants engaged in advocacy on the human rights of migrants regardless of status. It is necessarily not comprehensive due to access, perspective and the need to balance thoroughness and keeping to a readable length.

It is important to learn from this first edition in order to inform engagement with future IMRFs and the potential review of modalities after that second IMRF. Some lessons may be drawn for the regional migration reviews. This is offered as a contribution to institutional memory to ensure that any changes in personnel in the various UN bodies most closely involved between IMRFs do not weaken the potential of this process to deliver for migrants.

¹ Statement by Ms. Lauratuulia Lehtinen, Head of Unit for Humanitarian Assistance and Policy, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, IMRF General Debate, afternoon session of 20 May 2022, at <https://migrationnetwork.un.org/system/files/docs/Finland%20Plenary%20Statement.pdf>.

1

BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURE TO THE INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW FORUM

»[I]nternational migration requires a forum at global level through which Member States can review the implementation progress and guide the direction of the United Nations' work.«²

The International Migration Review Forum (IMRF) replaced the High-level Dialogues on International Migration and Development. These had taken place twice, in 2006 and 2013, at the UN headquarters in New York, USA. In 2016, a one-day UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants – that focused on large movements of refugees and migrants – produced the New York Declaration,³ which set out the plan to have two Global Compacts separately addressing migration and refugees.⁴ Following two further years of consultation and negotiation, these were adopted in 2018. In the text of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), States decided that the IMRF would review implementation of the GCM every four years. They also agreed that each IMRF would produce an »inter-governmentally agreed Progress Declaration«.⁵

Several important baselines for the IMRF and the process for its outcome document – the Progress Declaration (PD) – were established through the dynamics of the GCM negotiations as well as in the modalities negotiated and adopted at the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly (GA) in 2019.⁶

The GCM is a lengthy agreement aiming to cover all dimensions of international migration. It is affirmed in a UN GA resolution and as such, not something that States ratify or accede to. Although the GCM is described as »the first inter-governmentally negotiated agreement, prepared under the auspices of the United Nations, covering all dimensions of international migration in a holistic and comprehensive manner«,⁷ this careful wording should not be understood as describing the GCM as the *only* inter-governmentally negotiated agreement on or that applies to migration. As well as the treaties that address aspects of migration directly, all of international human rights law applies to migrants, regardless of their status, nationality, where they are in their migration, how they entered the country or their length of stay, or the sector they work in (if any).⁸

1.1 GCM BASELINES

1.1.1 A Lengthy Text

The length of the GCM reflects the challenge of covering the breadth of migration including factors before, during and after an individual's migration, as well as how it affects migrants' families, communities and wider society. The IMRF is intended to review four years of progress by all States across all 23 objectives and ten cross-cutting and interdependent guiding principles of the GCM. This is a big ask, compared, for example, to the High-Level Political Forum to review progress and challenges in implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This is an annual event, held over two weeks, that reviews States' implementation of only a selection of the 17 SDGs each year.

1.1.2 A 360-Degree Approach

Inclusion of the full range of aspects of migration covered in the GCM was seen as crucial to enable its negotiation and adoption in light of States' different priorities. This is perceived as an essential balance of perspectives in the GCM that must

² Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), para.49.

³ New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, UN doc. A/RES/71/1.

⁴ The Global Compact on Refugees and its follow up is outside the scope of this paper, see <https://www.unhcr.org/uk/about-unhcr/who-we-are/global-compact-refugees> and <https://www.unhcr.org/global-refugee-forum-2023> on the follow up work through the Global Refugee Forum.

⁵ GCM, para.49(e).

⁶ Format and organizational aspects of the international migration review forums, UN doc. A/RES/73/326 of 19 July 2019.

⁷ See, for example, <https://www.iom.int/global-compact-migration>.

⁸ All international human rights instruments are relevant in the context of migration and all the international labour standards of the ILO apply to migrant workers, unless otherwise stated, see ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration, Principle 9.

be maintained in all aspects of implementation, follow up, and review at the multilateral level, though it is understood that States can and will prioritise specific objectives. At the UN system and multilateral level this can lead to a perception that it is necessary to cover all aspects of the GCM and to do so as equally as possible so as not to upset this balance. In effect, certain priority issues did emerge throughout the inaugural IMRF process, but the sense of needing to maintain equal coverage of all objectives in the PD and the IMRF itself presents a significant challenge.

1.1.3 A Mixed Format

The GCM uses a novel format for UN agreements, containing 23 objectives, specific commitments in the paragraphs describing each objective, and a series of examples of actions States and other stakeholders could take to realise these. The majority of the GCM comprising these suggested actions complicates follow-up and review by reducing the common baseline for evaluation.

1.1.4 A »Non-Binding« Framework

The GCM text states that it is »a non-legally binding, cooperative framework«.⁹ This was central to securing its adoption and has continued to be emphasised by many States during the PD negotiations.

If the GCM is not binding on States, can progress be meaningfully assessed? Although the GCM overall is not hard law, in its agreed objectives and commitments it draws on, reaffirms, and applies a range of standards from different areas of international law, which are and remain legally binding on States. Its suggested actions are also based on a human rights-based approach (as well as other standards) and therefore reflect hard law obligations.

Prior to the adoption of the GCM, States had demonstrated a clear preference for the informal, voluntary, and non-binding processes to discuss migration and the situations of migrants. These focused on the exchange of good practices and lessons learned and were largely located outside of the normative framework of the UN, with limited stakeholder participation.¹⁰ For all its flaws, the GCM marked an important step away from this »politically-sheltered format« (Crépeau and Atak 2016: 133) towards the normative framework and the oversight that is required to ensure migrants' rights. As such, a clear focus on the legal bases of the GCM and existing obligations of States needs to be at the heart of any review. This will also benefit States by enabling more coherence and less duplication with their other reporting and review process obligations such those under the human rights treaty bodies and Universal Periodic Review (UPR).

1.1.5 An Intergovernmental Process

The GCM determined that, while stakeholder participation should be part of it, the IMRF would be an intergovernmental

process.¹¹ This makes States the primary participants and privileges their access.

1.1.6 An Assessment of Progress

The GCM mandates the IMRF to produce a PD. Whereas other processes such as the High Level Political Forum on sustainable development produce *political* declarations, the IMRF is tasked with producing an inter-governmentally agreed declaration on States' (and other stakeholders') *progress* at the local, national, regional, and global levels. This requires an assessment of efforts to implement the GCM, lessons learned and best practices, as well as the challenges faced by different actors – including migrants themselves – over the review period. This is a huge challenge to do in any sort of meaningful way – globally, over the 23 objectives and ten cross-cutting and interdependent guiding principles, especially when taking into account the diversity of migrants and their situations – and also to consider emerging issues.

1.1.7 Non-Endorsing Member States

States have overwhelmingly and repeatedly endorsed the GCM. First when it was adopted by acclamation at the Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration held in Marrakech, Morocco, on 10 December 2018.¹² Subsequently, through a UN General Assembly resolution on 19 December, which did go to a vote but with only a handful of States voting against.¹³ Some of the few States that had voted against or abstained on the adoption of the GCM engaged in the IMRF and its PD negotiations but cited this non-endorsement during negotiations of the PD as the basis for their positions. The PD has subsequently been mentioned in UN resolutions, for example with States »welcoming« it, and also some of the related work, in the resolution adopted at the UN Human Rights Council in July 2023.¹⁴

1.2 IMRF PARAMETERS: PRE-DEFINED MODALITIES

As part of the 76th session of the UN GA in New York, the organisation and chairing of the IMRF fell to H.E. Mr. Abdulla Shahid of Maldives as President of the General Assembly (PGA).

In the 2019 resolution setting out the modalities for the IMRF, States decided that it should follow a format of four interactive multistakeholder roundtables held over the course of the first and second day, followed by a policy debate and a final plenary session that consisted of an opening segment, a general debate, and a closing segment.¹⁵ It was also at this point, three years before the IMRF was convened, that

¹¹ GCM, paras.48, 49(b).

¹² With 164 countries present at the intergovernmental conference.

¹³ Draft resolution UN doc. A/73/L.66 was adopted by 152 votes to 5, with 12 abstentions (resolution 73/195).

¹⁴ Human rights of migrants: prevention and accountability for human rights violations in transit, UN doc. A/HRC/RES/53/24, preamble, para.16.

¹⁵ UN doc. A/RES/73/326, para.18.

⁹ GCM paras. 7, 15 (under the guiding principle on international cooperation).

¹⁰ Such as the annual Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) and Regional Consultative Processes.

States decided on how the 23 objectives of the GCM would be divided between the roundtable sessions (table 1).¹⁶ This resolution also requested that the PGA hold a one-day informal interactive multistakeholder hearing prior to the IMRF and invite a civil society representative to present a summary of the hearing at the opening plenary.¹⁷

Crucially, States mandated that each IMRF was to be held within existing resources.¹⁸ Although this allowed for four roundtable sessions as well as a policy debate and a plenary, the lack of additional funding limited the possibility of a comprehensive review of GCM implementation by all States, for example through discussion of the Voluntary National Reviews (reports assessing national progress, encouraged in the GCM, see further in Regional Processes).¹⁹

The modalities resolution also prescribes the approach and elements of the »brief, concise, evidence-based and action-oriented« PD to be adopted at the IMRF: an evaluation of progress in implementing the 23 GCM objectives; identification of the key challenges, opportunities and emerging issues in that implementation, and recommendations.²⁰

These modalities will also apply to the second IMRF in 2026 (unless States decide otherwise), after which States will review them for future IMRFs.²¹

1.3 IMRF COORDINATION AND LEADERSHIP

The IMRF modalities resolution sets out that it will be »convened under the auspices of the General Assembly and be chaired by the President of the General Assembly«. ²² It also mandates the UN Network on Migration – for which the International Organization for Migration (IOM) serves as Co-ordinator and Secretariat ²³ – to support with several aspects of the preparation and delivery of the Forum, including the preparation of the Secretary General’s (SG’s) report on the implementation of the GCM and the Coordinator’s facilitation of the policy debate.²⁴

The Office of the President of the General Assembly (OPGA) was supported by the UN Network on Migration through its Secretariat and membership. This included seconding a staff member from the UN Network Secretariat to OPGA to help facilitate coherence across the different bodies with organising and presiding functions.

The UN Network on Migration, welcomed in the GCM, was set up by the SG to improve coordination across the UN in supporting implementation of the GCM by Member States. It is logical that the Network Secretariat play a leading role in arranging the IMRF, given its function in bringing together UN entities and engaging with Member States and the work it has done to involve stakeholders. The range of UN entities with significant roles in the IMRF is unusual for high profile events of this sort which are more often serviced by and related to the work of a single UN entity. Symbolically this is significant because it recalls that the GCM is about both State practice and UN system action, in both cases recognising the critical importance of cross-sectoral collaboration.

Table 1:
Clustering of GCM Objectives for the IMRF Roundtables.

Round-table	GCM Objectives covered
1	(2) Minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin (5) Enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration (6) Facilitate fair and ethical recruitment and safeguard conditions that ensure decent work (12) Strengthen certainty and predictability in migration procedures for appropriate screening, assessment and referral (18) Invest in skills development and facilitate mutual recognition of skills, qualifications and competences
2	(4) Ensure that all migrants have proof of legal identity and adequate documentation (8) Save lives and establish coordinated international efforts on missing migrants (9) Strengthen the transnational response to smuggling of migrants (10) Prevent, combat and eradicate trafficking in persons in the context of international migration (11) Manage borders in an integrated, secure and coordinated manner (13) Use migration detention only as a measure of last resort and work towards alternatives (21) Cooperate in facilitating safe and dignified return and readmission, as well as sustainable reintegration
3	(14) Enhance consular protection, assistance and cooperation throughout the migration cycle (15) Provide access to basic services for migrants (16) Empower migrants and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion (19) Create conditions for migrants and diasporas to fully contribute to sustainable development in all countries (20) Promote faster, safer and cheaper transfer of remittances and foster financial inclusion of migrants (22) Establish mechanisms for the portability of social security entitlements and earned benefits
4	(1) Collect and utilize accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policies (3) Provide accurate and timely information at all stages of migration (7) Address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration (17) Eliminate all forms of discrimination and promote evidence-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration (23) Strengthen international cooperation and global partnerships for safe, orderly and regular migration

¹⁶ UN doc. A/RES/73/326, para.21(b).

¹⁷ UN doc. A/RES/73/326, para.15.

¹⁸ UN doc. A/RES/73/326, para.18(a).

¹⁹ GCM, para. 53.

²⁰ UN doc. A/RES/73/326, para.26.

²¹ UN doc. A/RES/73/326, para.27.

²² UN doc. A/RES/73/326, para.1(a).

²³ GCM, para.45(a).

²⁴ UN doc. A/RES/73/326, paras. 9, 13, 14, 18, 22, 23.

2

PREPARATORY STEPS AND PROCESSES

»[T]he success of the Forum relies on our collective preparation, our ambition, and our solidarity and cooperation.«

PGA remarks at the launch of the SG's GCM report, February 2022.²⁵

2.1 REGIONAL PROCESSES: UNEVEN AND UNDERVALUED

Recognising the regional nature of much migration, the GCM mandated Regional Migration Reviews to take place every four years, alternating with discussions at global level (the IMRF).²⁶ The Regional Migration Reviews in 2020/21 were the first opportunity for States and others to reflect together on the initial steps taken and on how to make further progress to implement the GCM (Townhead 2020). With main events organised by the UN Economic Commissions, there was considerable diversity in approach across the regions, in particular on stakeholder engagement.²⁷

In 2020/21, Member States were invited to contribute a self-assessment of their progress on implementing the GCM, as well as any challenges they had faced. They were also encouraged to outline what steps were planned to enhance their implementation of the GCM. In total, over 60 States and 18 regional and other bodies submitted GCM Voluntary National Reviews (see list in Annex 1). States were encouraged to take a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to completing the review, engaging with parliament, local authorities, National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs), civil society, and other relevant stakeholders. These will not be the focus of the next round of regional reviews: instead, States will be encouraged to undertake and share national reviews ahead of the second IMRF.

²⁵ PGA remarks at the Briefing on the SG's report on the GCM, 16 February 2022, at https://migrationnetwork.un.org/sites/g/files/tmzbdl416/files/docs/pga_remarks_-_briefing_on_the_sg_report_on_gcm.pdf.

²⁶ GCM, para.50.

²⁷ This overview of processes leading up to the IMRF and its PD cannot do justice to the efforts at national, regional and international level behind these regional reviews. For some further background see, UN Network on Migration, Regional Reviews, at <https://migrationnetwork.un.org/regional-reviews>.

Given the timing, the COVID-19 pandemic was a major concern in States' Voluntary Reviews and assumed part of the agendas for of these reviews and also constrained the format. There is ample opportunity to re-envision the second round of regional reviews in 2024/5 as they will not be taking place under pandemic response measures.

None of the regional reviews produced an agreed, negotiated outcome. This represents an advocacy loss for work in the region and also reduces the power of these reviews at the IMRF. As such, and given that so much migration is intra-regional, there is a need for better synergies between the regional and the global in order to effectively ground the IMRF and its PD in regional realities. This would meet the requirement set out in the GCM, for the regional reviews to »inform each edition« of the IMRF.²⁸ There is also scope to expand the regional approach by including focus on relevant sub-regional dynamics, challenges and opportunities.

Stakeholder engagement in the regional reviews was uneven, reflecting the different practices of each regional economic commission. Again, participation is mandated in the GCM itself.²⁹ Some regions instituted good practices that should be replicated in other regions and future reviews. These included a series of online stakeholder consultations ahead of the regional review itself, for example, following the clustering of objectives dictated in the modalities resolution. These consultative processes can be built on to provide more participatory processes. With the UN regional commissions less constrained by the terms of the IMRF modalities resolutions – though still working within their own established parameters – they have a freer hand to develop these practices further in the second round of regional reviews. For example, they could engage stakeholders earlier in the process, enabling their input to shape the review process and be involved in its planning (Beldjelti 2023).

2.2 THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON GCM IMPLEMENTATION

»The Global Compact reflects the commitment of the international community to make migration work for all – to

²⁸ GCM, para.50.

²⁹ *ibid.*

Table 2:
IMRF Dialogues.³⁰

Date in 2022	Topic	Organiser(s)
19 January	Webinar on clusters of objectives Roundtable 1	ILO, UNDP
26 January	Webinar on clusters of objectives Roundtable 2	IOM, UNODC
2 February	Webinar on clusters of objectives Roundtable 3	WHO, UCLG, UNMGCP
9 February	Webinar on clusters of objectives Roundtable 4	OHCHR, UNDESA
9 March	Webinar on gaps and emerging challenges: Missing Migrants, Missing Solutions?	ICRC, IOM
31 March	Webinar on gaps and emerging challenges: Whole of Society Approach: Government-Civil Society Partnerships on Alternatives to Immigration Detention (ATD)	UNHCR, UNICEF, IDC
13 April	Webinar on gaps and emerging challenges: Youth innovations in migration: Generating positive impacts for migrants and communities	UNICEF, IOM, UNMGCY
19 April	Webinar on gaps and emerging challenges: Dialogue in preparation for the IMRF Policy Debate	UN Network Secretariat
27 April	Webinar on gaps and emerging challenges: Promoting inclusive societies and ensuring the inclusion of migrants in COVID-19 response and recovery	WHO, IOM

make it a source of prosperity and solidarity, not a byword for inhumanity.« UN SG at the Briefing on his report on the GCM.³¹

UN SG, António Guterres, launched his second report on the progress of the GCM on 16 February 2022.³² This report, which was informed by the regional reviews, was expected to inform the drafting of the PD and offered recommendations across four priorities. The first priority reflected the reality of the implementation period: to promote inclusive societies and include migrants in COVID-19 response and recovery efforts. The second priority focused on the need to promote safe and regular migration, and the third on preventing loss of life and other tragedies during migration. Lastly, the SG stressed the interconnectedness of the work on migration, as »requiring collaboration and cooperation across all States and stakeholders at all levels« and set his fourth priority as building capacity.³³

The launch of the SG's report was held in person. Due to public health restrictions, the UN in New York had only partially re-opened at this time and was not open to stakeholders, despite the clear intention of inclusion of expressed by the PGA.³⁴ This was a notable step backward from the 2020 launch event of the first report from the SG that was held entirely online due to pandemic response measures and, though this limits some of the interaction, it facilitated participation by a very broad range of stakeholders. It is also not in line with States' commitment in the GCM to the whole-of-society approach. Civil society organisations (CSOs) and other stakeholders are not mere observers in this process, they are participants, partners, service-deliverers,

³⁰ See, <https://migrationnetwork.un.org/migration-dialogues>.

³¹ Opening Remarks at the Briefing on the SG's Report on the GCM, 16 February 2022 (SG's Opening Remarks), available at https://migrationnetwork.un.org/sites/g/files/tmzbdl416/files/docs/sg_remarks_at_sg_report_launch_16_feb_2022.pdf.

³² UN doc. A/76/642.

³³ SG's Opening Remarks.

³⁴ Letter from the President of the General Assembly – Briefing on the SG Report on Migration and Concept Note, 24 January 2022, available at <https://www.un.org/pga/76/2022/01/25/letter-from-the-president-of-the-general-assembly-briefing-on-the-sg-report-on-migration/>.

and often, migrants, the very subject of the Compact. With this in mind, it is important to note that the PD requests that the next SG's report (due in the second half of 2024) be presented at a plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly and explicitly refers to stakeholder participation in that event.³⁵ This emphasises both that this is an evolving process and that critique can be heard and responded to.

2.3 EXPANDING ENGAGEMENT

The UN Network on Migration Secretariat made concerted efforts to engage stakeholders through approaching the IMRF as a broad process rather than a single event, providing space for discussion and advocacy beyond that offered in many State-led processes at the UN.

2.3.1 The IMRF Dialogues

The UN Network on Migration convened an online interactive series of discussions through early 2022 in the lead up to the IMRF. In most cases these were the result of inter-agency work and some featured non-UN leads. Envisioned as a means of supporting preparation by Member States and other stakeholders, these online discussions covered the 23 GCM objectives (in four clusters as provided in the IMRF modalities resolution, see table 1) as well as a series on some of the gaps and emerging challenges in implementing the GCM (table 2). A panel of invited speakers gave short expert presentations, followed by input from Member State and civil society participants. Of the five Dialogues addressing gaps and emerging challenges, three reflect priorities in the SG's report and another is on youth, which is a cross cutting priority for this SG as well as being a listed priority for the PGA.³⁶

³⁵ UN doc. A/76/266, para. 77.

³⁶ The UN youth office (UNYO) was approved through a GA Resolution in 2022, building on the Office of the 's Envoy on Youth; UN GA, President of the 76th Session, Respecting the Rights of All, at <https://www.un.org/pga/76/respecting-the-rights-of-all/>.

With over a hundred people regularly participating online for the duration of the 90-minute sessions,³⁷ this enabled wider participation than could be afforded in a purely in-person process. This diversified who could be present from Member States, for example from national ministries as well as missions in New York or Geneva, in addition to enabling much broader access for civil society. These were fully open events with no accreditation required to join. This also provided more space for Member States and civil society to hear from each other.

2.3.2 Expanded Civil Society Access

Different spaces or processes within the UN have different levels of access for non-governmental stakeholders, but many UN processes are restricted to organisations with ECOSOC status.³⁸ The process to develop the GCM was opened up to a far wider range of stakeholders. The process for the IMRF and the discussions leading up to the PD negotiations built on this good practice and used the remote working practices of the pandemic years to enable a more organisationally- and geographically-diverse participation in the preparatory phase. This is essential for work on migration as many migrants and migrant rights advocates operate with limited resources and some will face restrictions on travel, especially to meet the entry requirements of the UN-hosting countries. The PGA approved over 230 stakeholder representatives to attend and participate in the IMRF.³⁹ In addition, the UN Network on Migration was able to provide some funding, through the Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MMPTF), to support the travel of 45 stakeholders to the IMRF.⁴⁰

As well as the Dialogues, the UN Network on Migration Secretariat provided other online or hybrid spaces to build stakeholder engagement and knowledge and facilitate their input during the preparatory phase. Some of these, like briefings by the UN Network Coordinator, are regular activities for the Secretariat that focused in this period in whole or in part on the IMRF, but most were created for the process. These included a consultation with stakeholders on the organization of the Multistakeholder Hearing and stakeholder engagement during the IMRF and town hall-type discussions with the two Ambassadors co-facilitating the PD negotiations. The Network also organised various (online) briefings for Member States, including at the regional level, that stakeholders were able to observe.

The UN Network on Migration Secretariat trialled different methods of information-sharing including the Migration Network Hub as well as email communication. This space was linked to Dialogues with questions and comments to

prompt discussion and also provided a platform for comments on the draft PD.

Though practical difficulties, such as time zones and language barriers, remain, it is critical that the GCM work – at regional as well as international levels – continues to be widely open to civil society with a range of modalities to facilitate engagement with diverse stakeholders. In this first round of IMRF, there were a large number of opportunities to engage ahead of the IMRF. Finding information ahead of time (or even afterwards) was challenging. Clearer and more timely information would assist civil society in strategizing on when and how to engage effectively with limited resources.

In addition to UN-facilitated spaces, there were other events organised by different UN entities and stakeholders themselves leading up to the Forum and further expanding the process beyond the dates of the IMRF itself.

2.4 CRITICAL CONTEXTS

The first IMRF and the preparations for it were marked by an unprecedented public health crisis with particular impacts on migrants and migration, as well as conflicts that gave rise to new mixed migration flows. At the same time, the climate crisis was worsening and becoming more visible in daily life with consequences for migrants throughout the migration cycle.

2.4.1 The Global Pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic and related response measures so changed migration that it dominated State reporting in this first round of reviews. Most States referenced it in their statements at the IMRF, often as a barrier to their implementation of the GCM objectives. Conversely, in their statement at the IMRF General Debate, Uruguay noted that the pandemic led to accelerated efforts in some areas and several States noted, for example, increased regularisation efforts during the pandemic. At the launch of the SG's report in February, Australia stated that they would welcome time being allocated during the IMRF to »discuss the challenge of integrating health security with border controls to support States [to] manage human mobility during global pandemics.«⁴¹ The challenge of having limited space to respond effectively at the IMRF to such a significant change in the migration landscape exposes a potential problem with the structure of the agenda being set in the modalities resolution (which pre-dates the pandemic).

The world was still in the pandemic phase of COVID-19 when the IMRF took place. Such a major public health threat created multiple complications for the practice of in-person diplomacy and advocacy at the heart of the work of the UN and put organisers under pressure as to when to assess it safe to open up sessions to wider participation.

³⁷ The 19 April Dialogue to prepare for the IMRF Policy Debate was one hour long.

³⁸ The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) allows limited participation in the work of the UN to civil society organisations that successfully complete the challenging and often lengthy process to obtain ECOSOC accreditation.

³⁹ See, Letter from the PGA dated 18 February 2022, at <https://www.un.org/pga/76/2022/02/18/letter-from-the-president-of-the-general-assembly-final-list-of-stakeholders-for-imrf/>.

⁴⁰ See, Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund Annual Report 2022, p.24; for more on the MMPTF, see <https://migrationnetwork.un.org/mptf>.

⁴¹ Statement by H.E. Dr Fiona Webster, Chargé d'affaires Australian Mission to the United Nations, at <https://migrationnetwork.un.org/sites/g/files/tmzbd1416/files/docs/australia.pdf>.

While understandable that UN decision-makers were working to try to keep their staff safe during this time and needed to abide by rules in place in New York, it is problematic that different modalities were in place for Member States and civil society. Moreover, these measures had negative consequences for decisions and communication about logistics for wider participation at the IMRF in May and negotiation sessions in March and April, impacting CSOs' decision-making and advocacy. It is possible that it also harmed State decision-making, for example, in trying to build confidence in the event through early commitment of high-level, in-person participation, which in turn may have affected the impact of the IMRF itself.

2.4.2 Geopolitical Backdrop

The IMRF and negotiations for its outcome document, the PD, took place against a backdrop of continued and widespread politicisation of migration, in particular high levels of anti-migrant rhetoric, legislating and policy-making in many countries. In addition, certain geopolitical developments, such as Russia's war in Ukraine, were a factor in States' negotiation positions and prominent in some States' interventions during the IMRF. As that war again triggered refugee movements from within Europe, some western European and other allied States – those that typically advocate restrictions on migration – pointedly referred to the conflict as a driver of migration. It was one of several ways in which States reckoned with the reality of geopolitical contexts of migration in their countries and subregions. It also had an impact on the schedules, workload and atmosphere at the UN in New York.

3

THE NEGOTIATION OF THE PROGRESS DECLARATION

»During this inaugural IMRF, we will adopt the first declaration of progress. This is of profound importance, as this will set the tone and tenor of every subsequent forum.«

PGA address at the Opening of the General Debate of the IMRF, 19 May 2022.⁴²

States had agreed (in the modalities resolution) that the work on the PD of each IMRF would be led by two (State) co-facilitators »to conduct open, transparent and inclusive intergovernmental consultations«.⁴³ Crucially, it was decided at this stage that the PD should be agreed, if possible, before the beginning of each forum.

The PGA appointed the Permanent Representatives from the governments of Bangladesh and Luxembourg as co-facilitators of the PD negotiation.⁴⁴ The role of the co-facilitators is to chair the negotiation process and guide it to a successful conclusion. The choice of co-facilitators is important for creating a sense of balance and trust, both in terms of the States they are from and the individuals themselves. It is not a coincidence that both co-facilitators represent GCM Champion countries. Although having co-facilitators from the global North and South is standard practice, it is particularly critical in migration discussions when south-to-north migration captivates so much of the political imagination and media attention in the global North, despite south-south migration accounting for a substantial proportion of international migration. It is also important in helping prevent a division between what are perceived as primarily countries of origin and what are perceived as primarily countries of destination. Building a clearer sense that all States are, to some extent, countries of origin, transit, and destination was relevant in enabling the negotiation of the GCM.

3.1 WHAT IS A PROGRESS DECLARATION?

As previously discussed (see An Assessment Of Progress, above), the requirement to produce a progress declaration is relatively novel in a UN process and is not defined in either the GCM nor the IMRF modalities resolution. Notably, it is a declaration and therefore does not create binding obligations on States.

At the launch of his report on the GCM in February 2022, the SG made clear that he wanted a »strong political outcome« to the process.⁴⁵ At the same event, the PGA stressed that the PD should »clearly assess our achievements in implementing the Compact, and facilitate better collaboration, especially pertinent to pressing areas and objectives.«⁴⁶ It is obviously critical to assessing progress to also identify implementation challenges. The GCM Champion countries had expressed interest in the PD »including some concrete commitments in specific areas«,⁴⁷ later affirming at the launch event that »The GCM Champions will strive for a Progress Declaration that includes actionable and measurable recommendations, wherever possible, and work towards ensuring the promotion of its implementation, championing and exchanging good practices.«⁴⁸

3.2 PARTICIPATION CHALLENGES

»[T]he voice of all stakeholders in our deliberations will be critical. A whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach is vital for the structure of the IMRF.«

PGA remarks at the launch of the SG's GCM report, February 2022.⁴⁹

⁴² PGA remarks at the Opening of the IMRF, 19 May 2022, at <https://www.un.org/pga/76/2022/05/19/opening-of-the-international-migration-review-forum/>.

⁴³ UN doc. A/RES/73/326, para.25.

⁴⁴ H.E. Ms. Rabab Fatima, Permanent Representative of Bangladesh, and H.E. Mr. Olivier Maes, Permanent Representative of Luxembourg.

⁴⁵ SG's Opening Remarks.

⁴⁶ At https://migrationnetwork.un.org/sites/g/files/tmzbd1416/files/docs/pga_remarks_-_briefing_on_the_sg_report_on_gcm.pdf.

⁴⁷ Letter from the Champions to the PGA on the IMRF, 31 January 2022, at https://migrationnetwork.un.org/sites/g/files/tmzbd1416/files/docs/champions_letter_to_pga.pdf.

⁴⁸ Statement of the GCM Champion countries at the Briefing on the SG's report on the GCM, 16 February 2022, at https://migrationnetwork.un.org/sites/g/files/tmzbd1416/files/docs/ecuador_on_behalf_of_the_champion_countries.pdf.

⁴⁹ At the Briefing on the SG'S Report on the GCM, 16 February 2022.

As is usual in UN intergovernmental negotiations, stakeholders and UN entities could and did advocate for changes to language, some of which were taken up and supported by States during the negotiations, with elements making it into the final version of the PD. However, a major challenge to participation in most UN negotiations is that the negotiations themselves mainly take place in English and the iterations of the draft PD were produced only in English.

While organisers, including the PD co-facilitators, had made a conscious effort to build and diversify civil society engagement in the run up to the IMRF, the event and the PD negotiations still took place in the UN in New York, with all its associated barriers to entry such as cost and visa difficulties. The co-facilitators advocated for expanded access to the negotiations and an accreditation process was opened up to allow civil society access beyond organisations with ECOSOC status. However, the further complication of pandemic restrictions meant that notice of access came too late for many migrant rights advocates, lots of whom need months to secure visas to the USA, as well as make other arrangements such as child care or time away from work to allow their participation. This is further exacerbated by the in-person only and closed (that is, not webcast) nature of negotiations.

States' practice of holding negotiations – known in UN processes as »informals« – separate from and concluding before the main UN session (in this case, the IMRF) excludes the majority of civil society stakeholders who are not based where negotiations are taking place or otherwise do not have capacity to work beyond the session itself. This may also present a challenge to some smaller missions in New York that have fewer staff to effectively engage, or even follow, extended processes.

Some planned negotiation sessions were also cancelled at relatively short notice, a further complication for stakeholder participation. And, in the end, some negotiations took place outside of the open sessions in what is termed »informal informals« with a small number of States and closed to stakeholders, a practice that is not open, transparent, or inclusive.

The co-facilitators held virtual townhall sessions to hear from a wide range of stakeholders and opened a space for written comments on the Migration Hub. While it is valuable to be able to raise concerns and make recommendations to the co-facilitators, it is an intergovernmental process in which civil society is not a negotiating partner – however much space is offered, the impact will always be less than that of States. A further benefit of the approach taken by these co-facilitators was that it enabled other Member States to hear the positions and perspectives of a range of civil society organisations.

For all these challenges, it is important to build on this IMRF/PD precedent of negotiations being open to civil society in the future sessions. This should continue to be inclusive of stakeholders working on migration, including migrants

themselves, and not limited to organisations with ECOSOC status. With the pandemic phase well over, it should be possible for the organisers to be clear about the joining process early enough in the planning to allow for CSOs to undertake the necessary work, such as fundraising and visa administration.

3.3 THE POWER AND CHALLENGE OF CONSENSUS

The co-facilitators made clear from the outset that they were going to work towards »a meaningful and consensual outcome« to the PD negotiations.⁵⁰ It is normal practice in UN negotiations for States to favour consensus and this informs State (and stakeholder) negotiating strategies. On a topic as politically divisive as migration, consensus carries real weight and value, perhaps especially in regard to the GCM because its adoption was voted. However, it requires compromise, and that has a cost, with some more progressive ideas and language likely to be left off the table if States do not think an issue or wording can achieve consensus. This can empower a small number of States to significantly limit a text and can, effectively, constitute veto power. In the end, some States who had advocated for a more progressive PD, including in regard to further commitments, referenced this in an explanation of position – a brief statement States have the option to deliver when the outcome text is adopted (see further on this in section 4.3.1 The Adoption of the PD).

3.4 GEOPOLITICS

UN negotiations are influenced by myriad geopolitical realities and relations. Typically, many States negotiate within intergovernmental groupings of States. These are mostly regional – such as the African Group, the grouping of Latin America and the Caribbean States (GRULAC), or the Western Europe and Other Group (WEOG) – or other association such as the G77 (for the Group of 77 of developing countries, though it is now over 130 countries). It was notable that these geopolitical groupings were much less evident during these negotiations. This is very unusual in UN New York negotiations. Most notably, the EU States did not work as a bloc. This contrasted with the GCM negotiations in 2020, when all EU Member States except Hungary were able to maintain an »EU 27« common negotiating position. This indicates how the complexities of migration, the different migration dynamics and politics in each country, affect their positions and bilateral and multilateral relationships. Although different States supported other States' positions and language suggestions throughout the negotiations, there were sufficient substantive and political differences that they did not work the PD negotiations in the usual manner.

⁵⁰ Co-facilitators' statement at the Briefing on the SG's report on the GCM, 16 February 2022, at https://migrationnetwork.un.org/sites/g/files/tmzbdl416/files/docs/luxembourg_and_bangladesh.pdf.

GCM non-endorsing Member States that participated in the negotiations presented various challenges, such as watering down language on commitments and undermining efforts toward achieving consensus. Some even argued that the PD could not reaffirm the GCM, as they could not affirm something they had not endorsed. This is a familiar argument when texts list treaties and other texts that are not universally ratified or endorsed and as such, was not difficult for GCM-endorsing States to counter. Hungary, who had voted against the GCM and continued to voice its rejection of it, did not participate in the PD negotiations, standing aside perhaps in part because of the potential impact on their upcoming role as the next PGA which was confirmed the week after the IMRF.

The USA under the Trump administration had disengaged from the GCM process before negotiations started. Under President Biden, they issued a statement of position in December 2021 endorsing the »vision contained in the GCM« and engaged with negotiations for the PD in line with this.⁵¹ A month after the IMRF, the USA hosted a separate process for States of the Americas, resulting in the adoption of the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection, which »builds upon existing efforts and international commitments and advances the vision set forth in the Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM)« and acknowledges »the progress noted in the International Migration Review Forum Progress Declaration for the GCM.«⁵² This changed position played a significant role in achieving consensus: there were several States that were vocally not in full support of the PD text but who were not politically willing to call for a vote on the text as a whole, as the USA had done during the adoption of the GCM in 2018.

Geopolitics always influence negotiations, at times bringing opposing views into a negotiation on a subject that is not central to the text under discussion. In this case, oppositional views about the inclusion (or not) of references to »water scarcity« in the draft played out throughout the negotiations and threatened to derail the consensus (see further discussion below, under The Adoption of the PD).

3.4.1 Champion Countries

The GCM Champion Countries initiative began in part as a means of building confidence in the GCM by highlighting and consolidating State support to the GCM to promote its implementation nationally and globally. The status of Champion appears to mean different things to different States, for example, some champion specific objectives of the GCM. For the PD, it proved significant to have a cross-regional group of States with a common interest in supporting the GCM

⁵¹ Revised National Statement of the United States of America on the Adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, 17 December 2021, at <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/GCM.pdf>.

⁵² Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection, 10 June 2022, at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/10/los-angeles-declaration-on-migration-and-protection/>.

already identified. This helped facilitate sharing of ideas and development of joint statements in some fora (including the launch of the SG's report). The Champions statement at the SG's report launch was impactful as it came at a time when it was still unclear what a PD was. Their call for ambition and for a text that made commitments helped create space for an IMRF outcome document that was not just declaratory. Regular meetings amongst the Champions allowed for sharing information and positions. Although the Champions delivered a joint statement during the IMRF's General Debate, there was no common negotiating position amongst the Champion Countries.

3.5 GENEVA: IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS AND A MISSED OPPORTUNITY

In the IMRF modalities resolution, States had indicated that »Geneva-based expertise« should feed in to the IMRF and PD processes.⁵³ This means the special procedures and treaty bodies of the UN human rights system, along with UN agencies, should be given space to participate in the process. The Committee on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and some of the special procedures gave input to the negotiations or participated in the IMRF.

The co-facilitators interpreted Geneva-based expertise to also include Member State representatives in Geneva. This was a novel approach in such negotiations and a welcome one, in terms of human rights advocacy on the PD, and opportunities for civil society (beyond those based in New York) to be able to hear Member State positions. The in-person briefings in Geneva that were usefully held by the co-facilitators of the GCM and by the co-facilitators of the IMRF modalities resolution could not be replicated and the online format perhaps contributed to this being an under-used platform, with large online presence from Member States but very few interventions. Other factors leading to limited use of these spaces centre on the leadership of negotiation in New York, meaning that Geneva representatives felt less able to speak to the substance of the negotiations.

This represents a lost opportunity for stronger human rights advocacy in the PD and for greater coherence between multilateral activity on migration in New York and Geneva. More openness to sharing perspectives from those working on Geneva processes would help to avoid duplication and better connect between the various strands of work within the UN on migration.

3.6 THE PROGRESS DECLARATION: A STRUCTURAL CHALLENGE

At the heart of the PD negotiations, and the PD itself, is a structural challenge in that it was intended to be »brief and concise«, which is at odds with the proposal that it contain

⁵³ UN doc. A/RES/73/326, para.7.

an evaluation of overall progress in the implementation of all 23 GCM objectives, identify the key challenges, opportunities and emerging issues in that implementation, as well as recommendations for further implementation of the GCM.⁵⁴

The initial draft of the PD shared by the co-facilitators, known as the zero draft, was issued with 57 paragraphs over nine pages, immediately demonstrating the challenge in being brief and concise. From there it only grew during the negotiations – the next version (rev.1, issued 2 April) was 65 paragraphs over 11 pages; rev.2, issued 13 April, grew to 69 paragraphs; rev.3 on 25 April had grown to 75 paragraphs and 13 pages. The final draft, rev.4, was issued on 9 May at 12 pages long with 77 paragraphs and it was this version that was adopted at the IMRF and then affirmed at the UN GA.

It is not just the inevitable length of the document that is the problem, but that even at this length it cannot meaningfully review all the work for and challenges in implementing the (also lengthy) GCM, draw on the wealth of evidence available globally on migration,⁵⁵ and recommend actions for further implementation. It would not be sufficient for States just to meet every four years and negotiate a new set of recommendations, these need to be anchored in the work to date in implementing the GCM and States' existing commitments to migrant rights and there needs to be meaningful review of the GCM work. The approach as to how to negotiate a brief and action-orientated review of such a range of issues and actions would greatly benefit from further thought ahead of the next IMRF, and potentially in the review of the modalities resolution that will follow that.

The extent to which the PD could be action-oriented was also under discussion by States in the negotiations, with the title of the final section of the PD, on further recommendations, repeatedly challenged and defended during the rounds of negotiations. It started in the zero draft as »Recommendations to accelerate the implementation of the Global Compact«, became »Commitments and actions to accelerate the implementation of the Global Compact« in rev.1, and was settled as »Recommended actions to accelerate the implementation of the Global Compact and to strengthen international cooperation on international migration« in rev.3, a heading that held through to the final PD, though some States continued to raise objections during the later rounds of negotiations.

3.7 TIMING

As early as February 2022, in their statement at the launch of the SG's report on the GCM, the co-facilitators shared their expectation to conclude negotiations by the end of April.⁵⁶ In

a letter dated 3 March 2022, the co-facilitators set out a road map of the planned progress towards the adoption of the PD two months later, including their deadline for the end of the PD negotiations. This set out their expanded approach including informal meetings with Member States ahead of the start of negotiations to inform the first draft of the PD and briefings for stakeholders before and during negotiations. A revised version issued on 23 March provided further detail, including clarifying civil society access to the process and the format/modalities for the different activities (see table 3).⁵⁷

Engaging with the PD required a quick turnaround for effective advocacy ahead of each informal. Despite the roadmap, it was not until the late stages of the negotiations that some States brought particular key concerns, including several global North States bringing more language on efforts against the smuggling of migrants.

3.8 PROCESS ISSUES

During the negotiations, the co-facilitators stated that they were not willing to consider new elements that had not been raised in the initial stages of the process. While it is not unreasonable to try and prevent a negotiation from being derailed through late introduction of significant and divisive issues, any time limit on new issues needs to be very clearly communicated in advance and should only come after States have had an opportunity to hear from each other and other stakeholders.

As is usual practice for agreements of this kind the final draft was shared under silence procedure. This allows a period of time for States to review the text and the opportunity to »break silence« by raising elements on which they do not want to join consensus ahead of the adoption.

⁵⁴ UN doc. A/RES/73/326, para.26(b).

⁵⁵ The IMRF modalities resolution called for the PD to be »evidence-based«, *ibid.*

⁵⁶ At https://migrationnetwork.un.org/sites/g/files/tmzbdl416/files/docs/luxembourg_and_bangladesh.pdf.

⁵⁷ Available at https://migrationnetwork.un.org/system/files/resources_files/2022-03-23%20IMRF%20PD%20co-facilitators%20letter%20-%20UPDATED%20roadmap.pdf.

Table 3:

Roadmap for the Consultations to Agree on the Progress Declaration on the Implementation of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration to be Adopted at the International Migration Review Forum (IMRF) in May 2022 – taken from the letter of the co-facilitators dated 23 March 2022.

Date	Time (EST)	Activity	Format
Thursday, 3 March	10AM – 1 PM	Informal meeting with Member States on the roadmap and the priorities for the Progress Declaration	Virtual
Monday, 7 March	8AM – 11AM	First townhall briefing for stakeholders on the Progress Declaration	Virtual
Thursday, 17 March	AM	Sharing of the zero draft	Email
Tuesday, 22 March	10AM – 1 PM	First round of informal consultations to hear general comments on the zero draft	Trusteeship Council Chamber
Friday, 25 March	8AM – 10AM	Second townhall briefing for stakeholders on the Progress Declaration	Virtual
Friday, 25 March	11.30AM – 1.30PM	First briefing for Geneva-based delegates on the Progress Declaration	Virtual
Monday – Tuesday, 28-29 March*	10AM – 1PM + 3PM – 6PM	Second round of informal consultations – first reading	Trusteeship Council Chamber
Tuesday, 29 March	6PM	Deadline to submit written comments on the zero draft	Email
Monday, 4 April	10AM – 12PM	Second briefing for Geneva-based delegates on the Progress Declaration	Virtual
Wednesday, 6 April	10AM – 12PM	Third townhall briefing for stakeholders on the Progress Declaration	Virtual
Thursday – Friday, 7-8 April*	10AM – 1PM + 3PM – 6PM	Third round of informal consultations – second reading	7 April: General Assembly Hall 8 April: Conference room 3
Monday, 18 April (all day) & Tuesday, 19 April (only afternoon)*	10AM – 1PM + 3PM – 6PM	Fourth round of informal consultations – third reading	General Assembly Hall
Wednesday, 20 April	8AM – 11 AM	Fourth townhall briefing for stakeholders on the Progress Declaration	Virtual
Monday, 25 April	10AM – 1PM	Third briefing for Geneva-based delegates on the Progress Declaration	Virtual
Week of 25 April	TBD	Informal informals if needed	TBD
Thursday, 5 May		Deadline to agree on the final version of the Progress Declaration	

* Please note that while two days have tentatively been booked for each reading, the reading may conclude earlier.

4

AT THE IMRF

4.1 THE MULTISTAKEHOLDER HEARING

Although not formally part of the IMRF, States, in the modalities resolution, requested the PGA »to organize and to preside over one day of informal interactive multistakeholder hearings one day prior to each forum [IMRF]« and to invite a civil society representative to present a summary of these hearings during the opening segment of the IMRF plenary.⁵⁸ The OPGA, supported by the UN Network on Migration, convened the multistakeholder hearing at UN headquarters a day prior to the start of the IMRF. These sessions, like the IMRF itself, were also available on the UN's WebTV portal, accessible either live or on demand to those who did not join in person.

With just one day to discuss GCM implementation from the experiences of diverse stakeholders worldwide, the agenda eschewed the approach set out for the IMRF of clustering the GCM objectives (see table 1). Instead, organisers drew on participants' diverse experiences of migration and working for migrants rights with three panels – one with representatives from different stakeholder groups, one with representatives from each of the regions, and a group discussion that aimed to »contribute collectively to a summary of the key recommendations and pledges that will feed into the opening plenary of the IMRF.«⁵⁹

The first panel heard from representatives from 13 stakeholder constituencies: migrant associations; migrant and diaspora organisations; local and regional authorities; civil society; academia; the private sector; trade unions; parliamentarians; NHRIs; faith-based organisations; the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies; media, and also the UN human rights mechanisms (in this case, the Committee on Migrant Workers). The second panel heard civil society perspectives from the five regions. The last panel gave space to reflect on key messages from the two previous panels and for a few further inputs. The time available, structure of the day, and diversity of stakeholder

perspectives meant it was not possible to collectively agree a comprehensive summary of the day. The summary report of the session was drafted by the appointed civil society representative in collaboration with the moderators of the first two panels of the multistakeholder hearing, and presented at the opening of the plenary of the inaugural IMRF.⁶⁰

The session was well-attended, with over 250 participants from all regions. State representatives were invited to attend as observers and several attended in person, with more (though impossible to know how many) following online. How to increase the presence of States and increase their visibility (to facilitate networking) without reducing the space for stakeholder participation is worth consideration ahead of the next IMRF. Representatives of several UN entities were also present. Different to the IMRF, interventions in the multistakeholder hearing focused on migrants and their families – the people-centred principle of the GCM – and the need for their needs and wellbeing to be at the centre of migration governance. As the PGA later reflected: »This hearing was important in that we heard from those who work on the ground, who are affected directly. As one of the participants said at the hearing, and we heard numerous times in the opening of the plenary yesterday, »nothing about us, without us.«⁶¹

Self-organised gender and child rights rapporteurs were given space in the closing session to offer their reflections on the hearing. This was a welcome initiative as one approach to emphasising these guiding principles of the GCM and should be institutionalised in future sessions – not just for the multistakeholder hearing, but for the main sessions of the IMRF and also in the preparatory work at the regional and national levels.

Given the breadth of the category of »stakeholder« and the diversity – including of focus, policy, and experience –

⁵⁸ UN doc. A/RES/73/326, para.15.

⁵⁹ International Migration Review Forum: Informal Interactive Multi-Stakeholder Hearing, Monday, 16 May 2022, Concept Note and Programme, at <https://www.un.org/pga/76/wp-content/uploads/sites/101/2022/05/IMRF-Multi-stakeholder-Hearing-Programme-FINAL-FOR-CIRCULATION-16-May.pdf>.

⁶⁰ International Migration Review Forum 2022: Informal Interactive Multi-stakeholder Hearing, Monday, 16 May 2022, Summary Report, at <https://migrationnetwork.un.org/resources/summary-report-imrf-informal-interactive-multi-stakeholder-hearing>.

⁶¹ H. E. Mr. Abdulla Shahid, President of the 76th session of the UN General Assembly, at the Noon briefing press conference, 20 May 2022, at <https://www.un.org/pga/76/2022/05/21/pga-iom-dg-press-conference/>.

Table 4:
IMRF Agenda.

	DATE	MORNING	AFTERNOON
	Monday 16 May	Informal Interactive Multistakeholder Hearing	
IMRF day 1	Tuesday 17 May	Roundtable 1	Roundtable 2
IMRF day 2	Wednesday 18 May	Roundtable 3	Policy debate
		Roundtable 4	
IMRF day 3	Thursday 19 May	Plenary – Opening segment; General debate	Plenary – General debate
IMRF day 4	Friday 20 May	Plenary – General debate	Plenary – General debate; Closing segment

of each type of stakeholder, there are no easy or concise solutions to their meaningful participation in the IMRF. But that challenge must not preclude innovative efforts in future reviews. Similarly, although it is welcome that a representative from civil society was invited to present a summary of the multistakeholder hearing at the plenary session of the IMRF, no one person can fully cover all civil society or wider stakeholder perspectives (just as no one person could fully cover all Member State perspectives). Elana Wong, speaking as migrant representative, later raised this in her statement at the Opening Segment of the IMRF Plenary: «... the fact that I am sitting here as the singular migrant voice, and so that migrant spaces this week have been so limited, is an injustice not just to our community and all those who work tirelessly to ensure all migrants, regardless of status, can lead safe and dignified lives, but to all of us here, working together for the successful achievement of the GCM.»⁶²

The separation of the multistakeholder hearing from the IMRF reinforces a division between Member States and other stakeholders that is at odds with the GCM guiding principle on a whole-of-society approach. While the IMRF is the primary intergovernmental platform for Member States to discuss GCM implementation, there is a benefit to better integrating more space for other stakeholders throughout the Forum itself in addition to a space that is primarily for stakeholders. Despite the limitations of the format, there is value to sharing even this brief snapshot in a space to which Member States are invited. Further thought, including more direct involvement from stakeholders, should be given to the format of the hearing. As the PGA noted in the opening of the IMRF General Debate: «My dear friends, I am very glad to welcome among us many migrants, who number among the many diverse stakeholders present throughout this process. You have played a pivotal role in shaping the Forum, and your presence this week enriches and deepens our exchanges.»⁶³

⁶² Statement by Elana Wong, Global Focal Point, Migration Youth & Children Platform, Major Group for Children and Youth, migrant representative, International Migration Review Forum Plenary, 19 May 2022, at https://csactioncommittee.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Opening-Plenary-Statement_Elana-Wong.pdf.

⁶³ Opening of the International Migration Review Forum, Remarks by H.E. Mr. Abdulla Shahid, President of the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly, 19 May 2022, at <https://www.un.org/pga/76/2022/05/19/opening-of-the-international-migration-review-forum/>.

4.2 IMRF DISCUSSIONS

«Let us set our sights high for this first IMRF and strengthen our commitment to make migration work for all.» UN Network on Migration Coordinator's Closing Remarks at the launch of the Secretary General's report.⁶⁴

The IMRF agenda opened with a series of Roundtables that fed into a Policy Debate then, over the third and the fourth days of the forum, there was a General Debate in plenary with the PD adopted during the closing segment (table 4). The time allocated was so limited that two of the Roundtables – the sessions focused on reviewing all of the GCM objectives – had to be run in parallel. It is outside the scope of this paper to provide an analysis or commentary on the substance of these discussions, focusing instead on learning from format and process, but some of the key points from these are captured in the PGA's IMRF Summary Report.⁶⁵

4.2.1 The Roundtables on the GCM Objectives

The IMRF convened four interactive multistakeholder roundtables covering the 23 GCM objectives in clusters of five to seven (see table 1). While necessary in practice to have a way of covering so much in the one-and-a-half days allocated (see A Lengthy Text, above), this initial approach set out in the IMRF modalities resolution has several limitations.⁶⁶ Although some of the objectives are closely associated, none of the clusters are fully coherent. Nor have the objectives received similar levels of attention by States over the four years since adoption of the GCM. This may be due to a lack of political will, resource constraints or simply that an objective is less pertinent to a State's geographical situation or the migration situations in that country or subregion. Moreover, the division of objectives across the clusters prevents discussion of some connections and interrelations between the objectives and of the overall framework and 360-degree vision of the GCM, most notably the crosscutting guiding principles.

The Roundtables, each co-chaired by two States with different UN entities working in support (table 5), were intended

⁶⁴ At https://migrationnetwork.un.org/sites/g/files/tmzbdl416/files/docs/coordinator_remarks_-_sgr_briefing_-_16_february_-_copy.pdf.

⁶⁵ Summaries of the Plenary, Round Tables and Policy Debate, at <https://www.un.org/pga/76/wp-content/uploads/sites/101/2022/06/IMRF-final-summary-report.pdf>.

⁶⁶ UN doc. A/RES/73/326, paras.18(a), 21.

to be »interactive, evidence-based, and action-oriented in nature, with participation of all relevant stakeholders«⁶⁷ and offer »space for discussion« to review the progress in implementing all of the objectives and guiding principles of the GCM, at all levels.⁶⁸ The format chosen for the Roundtables saw opening remarks by the co-chairs, then keynote speakers followed by a brief panel with about five speakers. Each Roundtable saw one or two panellists from States with representatives from CSOs, trade unions, other stakeholders, or from UN agencies comprising the rest of the panel. Non-governmental stakeholders and UN actors also participated as keynote speakers and/or moderators of the panels and interactive discussion.⁶⁹ The modalities resolution stressed that there should be adequate space in each for non-governmental stakeholder participation.⁷⁰ In practice, the interactive discussion that followed the panels was often shorter than scheduled in the programme, limiting the number of possible interventions. Interactive discussions were dominated by States, with only one or two CSOs given the floor, among other stakeholders, in each Roundtable (see speaker lists in Annex 2). As with all UN processes, and necessitated by the level of engagement, these interventions were time limited.⁷¹ The list of selected speakers from UN agencies and stakeholders for the Roundtables and the Policy Debate was made available online although time limits prevented all those chosen speaking in the designated session.⁷²

The interventions provided some information and reflections on States' work on different objectives, which could potentially serve as a basis for engagement and further advocacy by civil society. In some cases there were clear, monitorable commitments – for example, in Roundtable 4, the USA responded in their intervention to a criticism voiced by a civil society speaker from the UN Major Group for Children and Youth (UNMGCY) in the session about migrant nationals of developing countries – those directly affected by the IMRF discussions and decisions – being unable to participate in the forum due to not being able to schedule visa appointments. As host country, the US delegate stated that the IMRF would have been considered as urgent business that should expedite a visa request and committed to working with civil society on accessibility – an undertaking that may be election-dependent, given the divergent positions on the GCM from the different administrations.

⁶⁷ UN doc. A/RES/73/326, para.24(a).

⁶⁸ UN doc. A/RES/73/326, para.21(a).

⁶⁹ The Roundtable programmes are available at <https://www.un.org/pga/76/event/international-migration-review-forum/>.

⁷⁰ UN doc. A/RES/73/326, para.21(d).

⁷¹ The time allowed is three minutes for individual delegations and five minutes for statements made on behalf of a group of States.

⁷² See <https://www.un.org/pga/76/wp-content/uploads/sites/101/2022/05/IMRF-Pre-Selected-Speakers-from-Stakeholders-for-RT-and-PD-FINAL-FOR-CIRCULATION-1.pdf>.

Table 5:

State co-chairs of the IMRF Roundtables.

Round-table	GCM Objectives (see table 1)	State co-chairs	Associated UN entities*
1	2, 5, 6, 12, 18	Egypt and Germany	ILO, UNDP
2	4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 21	Ecuador and Tajikistan	IOM, UNODC
3	14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 22	Portugal and Thailand	WHO, UNMGCY, UCLG
4	1, 3, 7, 17, 23	Azerbaijan and Morocco	OHCHR, UNDESA

* together with the UN Network on Migration Secretariat

4.2.2 The Policy Debate

As mandated in the IMRF modalities resolution, the IOM Director General, as Coordinator of the UN Network on Migration, facilitated a Policy Debate in the afternoon of the second day of the IMRF.⁷³ The thinking behind the Policy Debate was to provide a space to focus on the challenges in the implementation of the GCM, including its links with the 2030 Agenda, emerging issues related to migration, as well as the capacity-building mechanism. In practice, the Roundtable discussions had already covered implementation issues, links with sustainable development, and emerging issues such as the COVID-19 pandemic. As a new element in a new procedure, the UN Network on Migration organised a Dialogue a month before the Policy Debate to support Member States and other relevant stakeholders in their preparations. This was intended as a space in which they could identify and discuss contemporary and emerging migration issues and in this way, inform the background note for the Policy Debate itself.⁷⁴

Like the Roundtables, the Policy Debate was supposed to be interactive, evidence-based, and action-oriented in nature, with participation of all relevant stakeholders.⁷⁵ The opening section heard presentations of the technical summaries of the Roundtables, two of which had just taken place that morning. The UN Network Coordinator provided a brief framing before handing over to a panel comprised of an academic, a mayor, and a youth activist, and then facilitated an interactive discussion.⁷⁶ There was no established list of speakers and (State) delegations wishing to take the floor were asked to indicate by pressing their microphones. A pre-selected stakeholder and intergovernmental organisation (IGO) speaker were given time after a few State interventions. In total, 16 States, one observer, four stakeholders, and three IGOs made interventions during the Policy Debate (see speaker list in Annex 3). A fourth IGO provided closing

⁷³ A/RES/73/326, para.23.

⁷⁴ Migration Dialogue Preparing for the IMRF Policy Debate Agenda and guiding questions, 19 April 2022, at https://migrationnetwork.un.org/system/files/resources_files/Migration%20Dialogue%20-%20IMRF%20Policy%20Debate%20-%20preliminary%20agenda.pdf.

⁷⁵ A/RES/73/326, para.24(a).

⁷⁶ See Concept Note and Agenda, at <https://www.un.org/pga/76/wp-content/uploads/sites/101/2022/05/IMRF-Policy-Debate-Programme-1.pdf>.

remarks. Interventions were short but some States did outline their good practices, key challenges, or future objectives.

In the conception of the Policy Debate, there was the suggestion that it »will also consider possible guidance for the United Nations system to strengthen its efforts in improving system-wide effectiveness and coherence and in supporting Member States in implementing the Global Compact.«⁷⁷ However, there was little engagement with this element in the State interventions.

The Policy Debate format proved to be a useful change up from the Roundtables and General Debate offering a space to make connections between objectives (beyond the current clustering approach) and reflect on the application of those objectives to recent developments. The precedent of incorporating stakeholder and IGO interventions among those by States is most valuable and should be retained in the Policy Debate and, ideally, expanded throughout the IMRF. It would also be valuable to explore other approaches to the Policy Debate that could bring in other perspectives – including from a diversity of stakeholders – perhaps by taking more of a regional perspective, especially as the regional preparatory work for the IMRF was not well-reflected in this first forum.

4.2.3 The General Debate

Opening the General Debate at the inaugural forum, the PGA urged delegations to »shape a global migration regime that is just and humane. One that benefits all of us on this planet, all of humanity on the move.«⁷⁸ The opening segment heard from the PGA, the UN SG, and the IOM Director/Coordinator of the UN Network, as well as a migrant representative from the UNMGCY, and the civil society representative invited to presented a summary of the informal interactive multistakeholder hearing.⁷⁹

Comprising half of the IMRF, the General Debate saw statements from 109 States and a further three joint statements on behalf of a number of States, followed by some observers (see speaker list in Annex 4). However, no CSOs were given the opportunity to speak. States took the floor in a hierarchical order of the seniority of speaker, probably with some flexibility to their availability, with one Head of Government, 20 Ministers, 27 Vice Ministers, and other high-level government representatives addressing the debate, as well as UN ambassadors and others. Many delegations included representatives of relevant ministries from capital and at least one included in its delegation representatives from some of the stakeholder groups: Canada's delegation included a migrant and an academic, among others. The level of attendance is a positive demonstration of State engagement with the IMRF and the GCM.

⁷⁷ A/RES/73/326, para.23.

⁷⁸ At <https://www.un.org/pga/76/2022/05/19/opening-of-the-international-migration-review-forum/>.

⁷⁹ Programme available at <https://www.un.org/pga/76/wp-content/uploads/sites/101/2022/05/IMRF-Plenary-Programme-1.pdf>.

The majority (11 of 17) of the non-endorsing States – those who had voted against or abstained in the 2018 General Assembly vote on the GCM – spoke during the IMRF General Debate. One of those, Chile, also delivered one of the three joint statements to the debate, from the Member Countries of the South American Conference on Migration (SACM).⁸⁰ There were also joint statements delivered by El Salvador on behalf of the Regional Conference on Migration, and Indonesia on behalf of the GCM Champions.

Many States' interventions demonstrated how this process could be relevant for migrant rights work. For example, States:

- *Countered framing that sees the value of migrants primarily in terms of potential economic benefit:* »There cannot be a compromise on the dignity of the human kind. It is not a commercial commodity that can be traded on the altar of economic expediency or for reasons of good international relations. Migrants should not be considered a charitable activity.« Sri Lanka.⁸¹
- *Raised violations of migrants' rights, calling out specific States and actors:* »We even observe systematic and intentional threats, even against the lives of migrants. For example, Greece's push-backs in the Aegean and mistreatment at the border caused loss of many lives. It is also upsetting to see the involvement of FRONTEX in these acts. Nothing can justify this.« Türkiye.⁸²
- *Promoted a human rights based approach:* The Member Countries of the CSM [SACM] condemn all acts of xenophobia, discrimination and racism, as well as the utilitarian treatment of migrants, regardless of their migratory status, rejecting any attempt to criminalize irregular migration.« Joint statement of the Member Countries of the South American Conference on Migration.⁸³
- »For the benefit of all, gender-responsiveness is and remains a guiding principle. We need gender-responsive policies, that means to make sure that women and girls in all their diversity have rights, resources and equal representation in shaping migration.« Germany.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Ecuador; Guyana; Paraguay; Peru; Suriname; Uruguay; and Venezuela.

⁸¹ Quote from statement by H.E. Mohan Pieris, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations, as delivered; written statement available at <https://migrationnetwork.un.org/system/files/docs/Sri%20Lanka%20Plenary%20Statement.pdf>.

⁸² Statement by H.E. Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey; written statement available at <https://migrationnetwork.un.org/system/files/docs/Turkey%20Plenary%20Statement.pdf>.

⁸³ Statement delivered by Ambassador Rodrigo Donoso, Director General of Consular Affairs, Immigration and Chileans Abroad, Chile, CSM Pro-Tempore Presidency; translated from the Spanish – written statement available at <https://migrationnetwork.un.org/system/files/docs/Chile%20Plenary%20Statement.pdf>.

⁸⁴ Statement available at <https://new-york-un.diplo.de/un-en/-/2532274>.

- *Shared good practices*: »The trauma of COVID-19 proved to all of us that there is a need to protect migrants through border governance measures based on human rights. We must therefore ensure that, as much as possible, we grant migrants the same rights that nationals have. It is a question of social justice and it's an ethical question. This is one of the best ways of fostering the integration of migrants and ensure they contribute to the development of the sending country and the destination country. In Senegal, no, that is, no difference is made between migrants and nationals in terms of access to healthcare and education.« Senegal.⁸⁵

Although some of the statements were very general, many States mentioned developments and plans that would provide openings for civil society monitoring and advocacy. While less positive, it is also instructive for human rights advocacy to hear the statements that seek to limit the realisation of the human rights of migrants.

4.2.4 Side Events

The IMRF hosted side-events in-person in New York (though often including virtual participation and/or hybrid modalities) or completely virtual. This opened up opportunities for diverse participation including those who could not attend the session for budgetary, visa, or other reasons. However, information about applying to organise a side-event and how many would be permitted was confusing, continuing into the session itself with organisers reporting difficulties booking rooms for their events, and restrictions on stakeholder access to parts of the building where events were held. Nonetheless, there were 45 virtual and 20 in-person side events scheduled during the IMRF, hosted by governments, international organisations, civil society, and other stakeholders.⁸⁶

4.3 IMRF OUTCOMES

4.3.1 The Adoption of the PD

Negotiations of the PD had taken place on the premise that it would be adopted by consensus, with all the compromises that requires. However, in the closing segment of the IMRF, when it came to adoption of the PD some votes were required. Ethiopia, took issue with inclusion of a particular phrase in relation to drivers of migration and their view that their objections had not been adequately addressed during the negotiations. Their amendment to delete reference to »floods, water scarcity« in paragraph 12 of the draft PD was rejected in a vote.⁸⁷ Following this, they called a vote on that paragraph and were the only State voting to reject it.⁸⁸ (See

⁸⁵ Statement by Mr. Moïse Diardiégane Sarr, Secretary of State for Senegalese Abroad; translated from the French – written statement available at <https://migrationnetwork.un.org/system/files/docs/Senegal%20Plenary%20Statement.pdf>.

⁸⁶ For lists of side events, see <https://migrationnetwork.un.org/in-person-side-events>, and <https://migrationnetwork.un.org/virtual-imrf-side-events>.

⁸⁷ Voting record 5 in favour and 91 against, with 29 abstentions.

⁸⁸ There were also 16 abstentions.

the voting records in Annex 5.) The Forum then adopted the draft resolution (the PD) without a vote – by consensus.⁸⁹

Following this, 25 States (and the Holy See, which has observer status at the UN) explained their positions on the PD in statements known as »explanation of vote after the vote« (see list in Annex 4). This included Greece, speaking on behalf of themselves and six other European States,⁹⁰ and Portugal on behalf of themselves, Finland and Ireland, demonstrating the divide within the EU bloc. In some of these interventions, delegations restated their position on the GCM and therefore on the PD and some of their key issues on migration or wider rights concerns: for example, several delegations affirmed, and others criticised, language in the PD of »multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination«, which is also in the GCM among many other negotiated texts. Several States delivered explanations in which they affirmed the text adopted and that they would have preferred a stronger position on rights. The adoption process, including the votes took the session more than an hour over its scheduled time.

In their statements, Canada and Colombia made specific reference, respectively, to the need for GCM implementation to be gender-responsive and child sensitive. These statements sought to draw attention to how these guiding principles of the GCM cut across implementation and cut across the IMRF. More thought should be given to how to support those seeking to draw out these, and other issues in the guiding principles, throughout the IMRF, for example through informal rapporteurship.

The PGA closed the IMRF with thanks to all participants and noting, »I am especially grateful for the participation of migrants themselves. Their perspectives must always be at the centre of discussions that concern their future and well-being.«⁹¹

4.3.2 The Pledges

The pledging initiative sought to encourage Member States or other stakeholders to commit to advance the implementation of the GCM in a specific and measurable way at the local, regional, national, or international level. The UN Network on Migration particularly encouraged joint pledges that build cooperation, given the cross-border nature of migration.⁹² Some of the pledges are very general though others are more specific technical, legislative, policy or financial commitments, and provide points for engagement and monitoring on issues such as regularisation and ending immigration detention of

⁸⁹ UN doc. A/AC.293/2022/L.1. The consensus held when the PD was subsequently endorsed in the UN GA on 7 June 2022, see UN doc. A/RES/76/266, with 10 States, most of whom have not endorsed the GCM, again entering explanations of position, see UN doc. A/76/PV.76.

⁹⁰ Statement on behalf of Denmark, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, UK, and Greece.

⁹¹ PGA Remarks, IMRF Closing, 20 May 2022, at <https://www.un.org/pga/76/2022/05/20/imrf-closing/>.

⁹² UN Network on Migration, International Migration Review Forum, Concept note on a pledging initiative, at https://migrationnetwork.un.org/sites/g/files/tmzbd1416/files/resources_files/imrf_pledging_note_en.pdf.

children. To date, most pledges have, appropriately, been made by the primary duty-bearers – States (112) and cities, municipalities, and local authorities (63). Pledges have also been made by international organisations, civil society organisations, migrant organisations, academia and researchers, private sector organisations, parliaments, and others.⁹³ The PD encourages States, and other stakeholders, to update on progress on implementing their pledges in the plenary meeting of the GA to be convened in the second half of 2024 that will consider the third report from the SG on the GCM.⁹⁴ This is a small, but concrete, step to help the pledges result in change – building not just for more ambitious goals, but for more ambitious action.

⁹³ Data as of 15 December 2023, at <https://migrationnetwork.un.org/the-pledging-dashboard>.

⁹⁴ UN doc. A/RES/76/266, para.77.

5

REFLECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

»The GCM is multilateralism in action. [...] In times like these it is even more important to strengthen multilateralism and to protect and strengthen its mechanisms and tools.«

H.E. Mr. Tobias Lindner, Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office, Germany, co-chair of Roundtable 1, IMRF, 17 May 2022.

Analysis of the PD or the substance of the discussions at the IMRF is outside the scope of this paper (on the former, see QUNO 2022). However, several elements of State discourse in the inaugural forum are telling for both the political moment of this first review and possibilities for future IMRFs.

This first IMRF was, on several measures, an astonishing success against a backdrop of global pandemic and conflict and with an understanding of the political toxicity generated around the GCM at the time of its adoption (see, for example, Cerulus and Schaart 2019), which was referred during the IMRF, such as by Belgium whose federal government fell due to its endorsement of the GCM. It brought a breadth of State and stakeholder participation and a level of senior government representation rarely seen in a UN discussion on migration. It included the adoption of a consensus declaration on progress on implementation of the GCM, less than four years after its own acrimoniously contested adoption. It agreed a PD that provided further recommendations to States and mandated new UN activity on both process (indicators to support implementation) and substance (missing migrants and humanitarian assistance). It generated over 200 pledges for specific action at local, national, regional, and global level and in their interventions, provided a platform for State commitments and priority setting, generating additional tools for national advocacy. It provided a platform to a small number of migrants, leading to both the PGA and IOM Director General/UN Network Coordinator affirming that there should be nothing about migrants without migrants. It did all this in the context of increasing anti-migrant policy making and political discourse, providing a platform for an alternative message about migration. It brought the procedures agreed in the modalities resolution to life and provided a model of how this new event could be, a model to learn from and improve on.

Notwithstanding these successes there is significant room for improvement and these reflections and recommendations are intended to support that.

As a State-led process, this inevitably centred State concerns showing up both the common threads and distinctions between them, for example repeated references, predominantly by delegations from the Global North, to States' obligation to readmit returning nationals. Both the PD and the IMRF would have benefitted from more concern for migrants and their rights, for example more on the implementation of labour rights protections for migrant workers. Future IMRFs and their outcome declarations need to better realise the people-centred approach of the GCM if the GCM is going to deliver for migrants. This should also enable better coverage of the diversity of migrants and migration situations.

Despite the separation of migration and refugee movements into two Compacts, the Russian war in Ukraine, beginning shortly before the IMRF, among other situations, saw multiple States raise the situation of refugees during the inaugural review of GCM implementation. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and response measures on migrants and migration was a prominent recurrent theme throughout the IMRF process. Climate change-induced migration is a reality, with discussion at the IMRF particularly focused on climate change as a driver of migration (see summary in Huckstep and Dempster 2022). These issues demonstrate that States will cover the issues most pressing to them regardless of the how the agenda is defined and, for migration and refugee movements, many aspects are closely intertwined at a policy and operational level and, without a multilateral forum in which this is specifically addressed, it will continue to surface in the IMRF. It also shows the impact of the specific geopolitical moment on the proceedings and outcomes of these reviews. This cannot be controlled for, but it is still possible to draw some lessons from the first IMRF to inform content and process for the next review as well as, hopefully, to strengthen effective strategic engagement by civil society advocating for human rights-based migration governance.

The IMRF further formalised the debate on migration in the UN, providing a new forum and associated processes for migration multilateralism grounded in the principles of the UN Charter. This is a significant new opening for advocacy for human rights-based migration governance. While it was far

from perfect, it is now a relevant opportunity to be considered in advocacy strategies on the human rights of migrants.

In reflecting on the IMRF, it is worth considering what critique is due to the constraints of the IMRF (what is built in through the GCM and the modalities resolution), what is due to the context in which it took place (for example, the public health restrictions), and what is due to a lack of political will on the part of Member States to deliver more. Uncertainties about the possibility of and procedure for a large, in-person event during the pandemic understandably impacted timelines for decision-making and communication. Evidently this can and must be improved in the second edition, to enable more timely communication and facilitating broader and more effective engagement.

The limitations imposed by the modalities resolution, which is expected to hold over the 2026 IMRF, States' reticence to open themselves up for scrutiny, and the breadth of issues that have to be covered remain a barrier to substantive review of progress or meaningful assessment of challenges. It will be interesting to see how the shift to encouraging submission of GCM Voluntary National Reviews ahead of the IMRF, rather than the regional reviews, can make a difference. If that shift still does not allow for a greater element of review in the second IMRF then consideration should be given to revision of the modalities to enable this.

Another challenge is in matching the reality of shifting migration dynamics to the rigidity of working to pre-set modalities. Although the modalities designated the policy debate session to focus on »contemporary and emerging issues related to migration«⁹⁵ and, as described above, States were open to raising a range of developments, there was not space for a detailed, technical discussion in a way that would capture lessons learned, for example, to guide rights-based and migrant-centric practice in future epidemics and pandemics. Member States could have used the space more effectively, for example the PD could have been used to create additional spaces for dialogue amongst States and stakeholders on topics that need more technical, discursive formats than the IMRF allowed.

There is an opportunity and need for improved coherence between the IMRF and other UN processes relevant to migration (see also, Yildiz 2022). If these interconnections can be strengthened to create a more cohesive UN architecture on migration then the expectation that the IMRF can, and should, cover everything in detail can be lowered and the various spaces for discussion can be optimised. Greater coherence would include ensuring that different fora are not used to weaken existing law and standards. This requires strengthened UN system coherence, which the UN Network on Migration is intended to help produce and can better support if effectively resourced. Coherence can also be supported by consistency in positions by Member States in different bodies and better understanding of the multilateral landscape and how to use different processes to reinforce

⁹⁵ UN doc. A/RES/73/326, para.23.

each other, reducing duplication and workload on missions. This could also benefit from effective civil society strategies to take issues forward through the different bodies, although adequate resourcing is needed to provide the capacity in civil society to engage effectively across multiple interconnected UN processes.

As the process matures, a greater understanding of its place within a broader multilateral architecture will be necessary to make the best use of the new Forum. The focus on the GCM in the IOM International Dialogue on Migration, the transmission of the IMRF report to the High Level Political Forum on sustainable development and references to the IMRF outcomes in UN Human Rights Council resolutions are indicative that initial steps are being taken to better weave this together.⁹⁶ The delivery of mirror pledges (connected pledges made in both the IMRF and the Global Refugee Forum (GRF)) shows that States' understanding of the potential for mutually reinforcing interplay between processes is already developing.

Understanding the IMRF as a broader process beyond the four days in New York mitigates the challenge of many topics and not enough space for all voices. The approach can be summarised as »broad process, not single event« and is evidenced by the number of entry points that the UN Network and PD co-facilitators created ahead of the IMRF. This ranged from openings for input to the SG report, through the nine IMRF Dialogues, to the nine hours of virtual townhall space during the PD negotiations. All of these opportunities were virtual and required no specific organisational status for stakeholders to join. There was interpretation for some of these events and some scheduling decisions based on enabling access for those in various time zones. Challenges for civil society participation still arose, including timeliness of information, language accessibility and, significantly, capacity.

There are some straightforward procedural fixes that can help improve accessibility to the process as a whole in future, both the model of the first IMRF and a (hopefully) pandemic-free context will facilitate those for the next IMRF. Perhaps more interesting is the question of capacity and comprehension. Democratised access requires good information flows and modalities without restrictive registration criteria, or processes (including visa restrictions), but it also requires resourcing and capacity building for civil society to enhance engagement and move from presence to effective participation.

Unsurprisingly on a topic as broad as migration, civil society is also broad – there are a range of geographic and issue-based networks, coalitions, and umbrella bodies, as well as individual organisations, all with different levels of access and strategies for engagement. Facilitation of the participation of

⁹⁶ See, for example, the Concept note and Agenda for the UN Network on Migration side event at the 2022 HLPF on Side Event »Actioning the commitments of the International Migration Review Forum (IMRF) progress declaration to advance the full implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development«, at https://migrationnetwork.org/system/files/event_files/2022%20HLPF%20Side%20Event_DRAFT%20Concept%20Note_13%20July_clean.pdf.

the breadth of migration civil society is critical, with adequate resources for strategic advocacy, including at the global level. Resourcing covers both financial resources but also knowledge to support assessment of the potential role of the IMRF in advocacy strategies and guidance to engage for those including it in their strategies. More democratised civil society access values effective engagement over efficient engagement. A range of focused inputs that provide specificity and depth are more useful to a process than a single input or very limited number of inputs nominally representing the whole of a stakeholder group. The IMRF as broad-process-not-single event risks becoming a double-edged sword: the diversity of spaces to engage with supports democratised access but the number requires further work to assess where limited resources are best used. This is not an argument against building on the model of IMRF as broad process, instead it is a call for more information and support to enable organisations to learn about these different options, engage where it is most effective for them to do so, follow developments in other spaces, and to strengthen and diversify the GCM's civil society constituency.

This is a young and evolving process. The first IMRF process has provided a helpful model and a trial of the prescribed modalities, but there is space and opportunity for improvement as well as the possibility of revising the modalities after the 2026 IMRF. The next IMRF will need to incorporate review of progress on the actions and commitments in the PD in addition to the GCM itself, including potentially through greater attention to the GCM Voluntary National Reviews. There is more to do to realise its potential and work together towards more ambitious goals.

5.0.1 Reflections on the IMRF for migrant rights advocacy

Though challenges remain, the IMRF and its processes beyond the four days in New York present a new and valuable opportunity for national, regional, and global advocacy for the human rights of migrants through a set of additional entry points including pledging and a negotiated outcome, which can make recommendations to States and mandate UN activity on migration. However, it also presents challenges in following the range of activities, assessing their likely impact and considering how best to use limited resources. The IMRF itself provides some valuable opportunities for civil society advocacy without accreditation, costs, or travel, as it can be watched online live or later. Though not all States make interventions, and not all who do share commitments, many do mention development or plans that can be monitored by national CSOs, providing points for engagement and advocacy (Yildiz 2022; Cornelisse and Reneman 2022). Access to a list of the interventions would help with this, as would access to the written versions of the statements, many of which, at least for the general debate, are available online.⁹⁷

As with all State-led events and processes what States do and say carries the most weight and effective advocacy will necessarily include engagement with Member States. As with the GCM negotiations, supporting and engaging with cross-regional, issue-based groupings of Member States can be an effective strategic approach. The significant number of online and hybrid events arranged by the UN Network provide some opportunities to try networking and relationship building with Member States without needing to access particular cities or UN spaces. Similarly use of existing engagement with other UN events and entities discussing migration (for example, UN Human Rights Council, International Labour Conference, World Health Assembly, as well as events at regional level) could enable some impact without attendance at the IMRF itself without increasing costs.

However, to capitalise on these opportunities there is a significant need for increased resourcing both to CSOs seeking to engage and to organisations that can help support and inform engagement through briefings, updates in multiple languages, and training or information sharing webinars from early in the process to help inform strategic planning and engagement.

5.1 KEY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 2026 IMRF AND BEYOND

Reimagine the IMRF as an element of the broader UN architecture on migration governance and migrant rights to build coherence in the work across all relevant UN processes and entities and further broaden and deepen engagement by all stakeholder groups.

Build on the good practice in facilitating participation, improving this wherever possible, including by:

- retaining and further expanding the practice of accreditation beyond ECOSOC, ensuring the possibility of access for organisations not involved in previous processes;
- guaranteeing that the restrictive practices resulting from public health measures do not set a precedent and return to, for example, enabling stakeholder access to the SG's report launch;
- providing the calendar for events and key moments (such as registration dates) as far in advance as possible;
- replicating the roadmap for the PD negotiations (keeping the multistakeholder town halls with the co-facilitators) and providing this as far in advance as possible;
- working with the USA to make good on their commitment to support visa applications for the second IMRF as host nation.

Answer the call for »nothing about migrants without migrants« by explicitly creating space for meaningful engagement by migrants and migrant-led organisations throughout

⁹⁷ For example, most of the Member State interventions in the General Debate are available at <https://migrationnetwork.un.org/international-migration-review-forum-2022#>.

the entire IMRF process, including through specific speaking slots, inclusion in delegations, and targeted information on engagement.

Rethink the approach to the mandate to draw on Geneva expertise in the development of the PD, consult with relevant Geneva-based entities and missions on how to facilitate useful discussion, for example on thematic or sectoral lines.

Work with stakeholders, in all their diversity, on how to make the multistakeholder hearing more effective, including through more discursive formats, greater visibility for the Members States in the room (to show the level of engagement and facilitate networking), and better transmission content into the IMRF itself.

Adequately resource the UN Network on Migration, including its Secretariat, to enable the organisation of the IMRF as a broad process and facilitate well-informed engagement by Member States and other stakeholders, including through drawing on the expertise of members of the UN Network on Migration at global, regional, and country level.

Continue to enable wider and further discussion of the whole of the GCM and selected topics through platforms like the IMRF Dialogues; continue the practice of multistakeholder-led discussion spaces, consider broadening who can propose and lead IMRF Dialogues (drawing on practice of diversifying this in the GCM talks).

Consider how to create more space for review of State practice including through the use of side meetings to hear and comment on GCM voluntary national reviews.

Consider how to better incorporate cross-cutting issues (including those explicitly contained in the guiding principles), emerging issues, and other topics such as mixed migration and the impacts of the adverse effects of climate change on migrants. However, more explicit inclusion of space for such issues must not further reduce the possibility of review of State practice.

Further the practice of rapporteurs on selected issues to better draw out cross cutting issues. This could be trialled at the next IMRF, as well as at the second round of regional reviews, through provision of space in the General Debate or a dedicated side event to hear initial reflections and through space in (or annexed to) the report on the IMRF.

Better incorporate outcomes and learning from the regional review processes, this could include one or more IMRF Dialogues on outcomes of the regional reviews and well as dedicated space in the IMRF itself, for example inclusion on panels in the Roundtables, or speaking slots to cover the regional reviews, dedicated side event space.

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ANNEXES

Annex 1: List of GCM Voluntary National Reviews.⁹⁸

Member State Submissions		Regional and Other Submissions
1. Albania	33. Kenya	1. Abu Dhabi Dialogue
2. Argentina	34. Kyrgyzstan	2. Arab Region – GCM Regional Review Outcome
3. Armenia	35. Mauritania	3. Arab Regional Consultative Process on Migration
4. Azerbaijan	36. Mauritius	4. ECA Africa Regional GCM Review
5. Belarus	37. Moldova	5. ECOWAS Regional Report on Consultations on GCM
6. Belgium	38. Mongolia	6. ESCAP Asia Pacific Regional GCM Review
7. Bolivia	39. Morocco	7. Europe EU Services Contribution to GCM IMRF
8. Cabo Verde	40. Netherlands	8. GFMD Report to the IMRF
9. Cameroon	41. Niger	9. Ibero American Network on Migration Authorities Communique on IMRF
10. Canada	42. Nigeria	10. International Dialogue on Migration Final Report
11. Chad	43. North Macedonia	11. IOM Summary of Survey on Inter-State Consultation Mechanisms on migration (ISCM) input to the International Migration Review Forum (IMRF)
12. Colombia	44. Peru	12. Latin America and the Caribbean GCM Regional Review
13. Costa Rica	45. Philippines	13. MERCOSUR Statement to the IMRF
14. Denmark	46. Portugal	14. OHCHR Summary of the Intersessional Panel on Human Rights of Migrants in Vulnerable Situations
15. Djibouti	47. Republic of Korea	15. Regional Conference on Migration Extraordinary Declaration Ahead of the IMRF
16. Ecuador	48. Serbia	16. SADC GCM Regional Review
17. Egypt	49. Sierra Leone	17. South American Conference on Migration Statement to the IMRF
18. El Salvador	50. Spain	18. UNECE GCM Regional Review Summary
19. Eswatini	51. Sweden	
20. Ethiopia	52. Tajikistan	
21. Finland	53. Tonga	
22. Gabon	54. Tunisia	
23. Gambia	55. Türkiye	
24. Germany	56. Turkmenistan	
25. Greece	57. Tuvalu	
26. Guatemala	58. United Arab Emirates	
27. Guinea Bissau	59. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	
28. Honduras	60. Uruguay	
29. Iraq	61. Uzbekistan	
30. Jamaica		
31. Japan		
32. Kazakhstan		

⁹⁸ As available at <https://migrationnetwork.un.org/international-migration-review-forum-2022#>.

Annex 2: List of Interventions Delivered During the Interactive Discussions of the IMRF Roundtables, 17 and 18 May 2022.

Roundtable 1	Roundtable 2	Roundtable 3	Roundtable 4
1. Chile	1. Venezuela	1. Uruguay	1. Türkiye
2. Türkiye	2. Bangladesh	2. Türkiye	2. Spain
3. Saudi Arabia	3. Uruguay	3. Venezuela	3. EU
4. Tunisia	4. United States of America	4. Africa-Europe Diaspora Development Platform (ADEPT)	4. Major Group for Children and Youth
5. Pakistan	5. United Arab Emirates	5. UNDP	5. ECLAC – followed by intervention on behalf of the five UN Economic Commissions
6. PDD, hosted by UN Office of Project Services (UNOPS)	6. Asociación Rumiñahui, Spain	6. Colombia	6. Netherlands
7. Argentina	7. UNICEF	7. Mexico	7. Holy See
8. Guyana	8. Algeria	8. Thailand	8. Mexico
9. Portugal	9. Thailand	9. Danish Red Cross, IFRC	9. City of Montevideo, Uruguay
10. City of North Dhaka, Bangladesh	10. Togo	10. IFAD-FAO-WFP	10. FAO
11. Spain	11. Nigeria	11. Finland	11. Guatemala
12. Sri Lanka	12. Morocco	12. Holy See	12. Philippines
13. FAO-IFAD-WFP	13. International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)	13. Algeria	13. Colombia
14. UNHCR	14. UNHCR	14. ITUC	14. IOM
15. BWI	15. Migration Policy Institute (MPI)	15. Indonesia	15. Agency Damo Radu
16. Canada	16. Migrant Forum in Asia (MFA)	16. Ecuador	16. India
17. Nepal	17. Greece	17. Philippines	17. Venezuela
18. Ethiopia	18. South Africa	18. Sisters of Mercy of the Americas / NGO Committee on Migration	18. Togo
19. Russian Federation	19. Pakistan	19. ILO	19. Save the Children
20. Holy See	20. Argentina	20. Pakistan	20. Russian Federation
21. IOM	21. Egypt	21. Bolivia	21. Belgium
22. OHCHR	22. Türkiye	22. Argentina	22. Canada
23. Global Coalition on Migration	23. Germany		23. Malawi
24. Worldwide ERC (Employee Relocation Council)	24. Guatemala		24. USA
25. Egypt	25. OHCHR		25. Pakistan
26. Norway			26. Saudi Arabia
27. Ecuador			
28. Japan			

Annex 3: List of Interventions Delivered During the Interactive Discussion of the IMRF Policy Debate, 18 May 2022.

1. European Union	13. OHCHR
2. Guatemala	14. Netherlands
3. India	15. Türkiye
4. Pakistan	16. Uruguay
5. Swedish Red Cross / IFRC	17. Ireland
6. Panama	18. BWI, on behalf of Global Unions and PSI
7. Portugal	19. El Salvador
8. Algeria	20. Niger
9. UN Women	21. USA
10. Iraq	22. Centro de Atención a la Familia Migrante, CAFAMI A.C.
11. Mexico	23. ILO
12. APMM	24. Holy See

Annex 4: List of Interventions Delivered During the IMRF General Debate and Adoption of the Progress Declaration.

HG Head of Government M Minister VM Vice Minister HL High Level representative

19 May – Morning Session		
1. Bosnia and Herzegovina (HG)	9. Lithuania (M)	18. Niger (M)
2. El Salvador (M) (on behalf of Regional Conference on Migration)	10. Tajikistan (M)	19. Djibouti (M)
3. El Salvador (M) [in national capacity]	11. Greece (M)	20. Chad (M)
4. European Union (M)	12. Canada (M)	21. Malawi (M)
5. Türkiye (M)	13. Ghana (M)	22. Uruguay (VM)
6. Luxembourg (M)	14. Guatemala (M)	23. Bangladesh (VM)
7. Philippines (M)	15. Azerbaijan (M)	24. United States (M)
8. Portugal (M)	16. Hungary (M)	
	17. Turkmenistan (M)	
19 May – Afternoon Session		
25. India (VM)	37. Belgium (VM)	48. Chile (HL) [in national capacity]
26. Honduras (VM)	38. Ethiopia (VM)	49. Armenia (HL)
27. Cambodia (VM)	39. Belize (VM)	50. Mali (HL)
28. Republic of Moldova (VM)	40. Senegal (VM)	51. Japan (HL)
29. Colombia (VM)	41. Bolivia (Plurinational State of) (VM)	52. Denmark (HL)
30. Cuba (VM)	42. Croatia (VM)	53. Iraq (HL)
31. Argentina (VM)	43. Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) (VM)	54. Serbia (HL)
32. Panama (VM)	44. Mexico (VM)	55. Botswana (HL)
33. Kyrgyzstan (VM)	45. South Africa (VM)	56. Guyana (HL)
34. Spain (VM)	46. Gambia (VM)	57. Kazakhstan (HL) RIGHT OF REPLY: Azerbaijan / Armenia / Azerbaijan
35. Ecuador (VM)	47. Chile (HL) (on behalf of the South American Conference on Migration)	
36. Dominican Republic (VM)		
20 May – Morning Session		
58. Sweden (VM)	70. China	82. Russian Federation
59. Ireland (VM)	71. Egypt	83. Holy See
60. Paraguay (HL)	72. Morocco	84. Algeria
61. United Kingdom (HL)	73. Tunisia	85. Malta
62. Mauritius (HL)	74. Democratic Republic of the Congo (HL)	86. Thailand
63. United Arab Emirates (HL)	75. Nepal	87. Côte d'Ivoire
64. Dominica (VM)	76. Rwanda	88. Syrian Arab Republic
65. Madagascar (HL)	77. Sri Lanka	89. Viet Nam
66. Pakistan (HL)	78. Norway	90. Uganda
67. Netherlands (HL)	79. Burkina Faso	91. Eritrea
68. Nigeria (HL)	80. Germany (HL)	92. France
69. Indonesia (on behalf of the GCM Champions)	81. United Republic of Tanzania	
20 May – Afternoon Session		
93. Peru	103. Togo	113. Haiti
94. Iran (Islamic Republic of)	104. North Macedonia	114. League of Arab States
95. Jordan	105. Tuvalu	115. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
96. Nicaragua	106. Belarus	116. The International Committee of the Red Cross
97. New Zealand	107. Uzbekistan	117. International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)
98. Republic of Korea	108. Albania	118. Sovereign Order of Malta
99. Maldives	109. Mozambique	119. International Institute for Democracy & Electoral Assistance
100. Finland	110. Cameroon	
101. Qatar	111. Lebanon	
102. Kuwait	112. Costa Rica	
20 May – Closing Section – Adoption of the Progress Declaration		
1. Ethiopia (to introduce draft amendment)	7. Portugal (on behalf of Finland, Ireland and Portugal)	17. Ethiopia
Explanations of Vote/Position After Adoption:	8. Bulgaria	18. Iraq
1. Greece (M) (on behalf of Denmark, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, UK, and Greece)	9. Singapore	19. Canada
2. United States	10. Algeria	20. Saudi Arabia
3. Hungary	11. Czech Republic	21. El Salvador
4. Poland	12. Egypt	22. Colombia
5. Latvia	13. Malaysia	23. Iran (Islamic Republic of)
6. Italy	14. Austria	24. Belarus
	15. Mexico	25. Russian Federation
	16. Holy See	26. Morocco

Annex 5: Voting at the IMRF.⁹⁹

Vote on Amendments to PD para.12, largely focused on water scarcity language: ¹⁰⁰
For: Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Timor-Leste
Against: Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands (Kingdom of the), New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zimbabwe
Abstentions: Algeria, Angola, Austria, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, China, Czechia, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Gambia, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Italy, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Nicaragua, Poland, Russian Federation, San Marino, Senegal, Singapore, Uganda.
Vote to retain para.12 as drafted:
For: Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands (Kingdom of the), New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zimbabwe.
Against: Ethiopia
Abstentions: Algeria, Angola, Austria, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Czechia, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Libya, Poland, San Marino, Senegal, Singapore

⁹⁹ Report of the International Migration Review Forum
17–20 May 2022, New York, UN doc. A/AC.293/2022/2, para.24

¹⁰⁰ Draft amendment A/AC.293/2022/L.2.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APMM	Asia Pacific Mission for Migrants
ATD	Alternatives to detention
BWI	Building and Wood Workers' International
CSO	Civil society organisation
ECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
ECLAC	United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
EST	Eastern Standard Time
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GA	UN General Assembly
GCM	Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
GFMD	Global Forum on Migration and Development
GRF	Global Refugee Forum
GRULAC	Group of Latin America and Caribbean Countries
HE	Her/His Excellency
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDC	International Detention Coalition
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IGO	Intergovernmental organisation
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMRF	International Migration Review Forum
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISCM	Inter-State Consultation Mechanisms on Migration
ITUC	International Trade Union Confederation
MMPTF	Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund
NHRI	National Human Rights Institution
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OPGA	Office of the President of the UN General Assembly
PD	Progress Declaration
PDD	Platform on Disaster Displacement
PGA	President of the UN General Assembly
PSI	Public Services International
SACM	South American Conference on Migration
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SG	Secretary General
UCLG	United Cities and Local Governments
UN	United Nations
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMGCY	United Nations Major Group for Children and Youth
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNYO	United Nations Youth Office
UPR	Universal Periodic Review
WEOG	Western Europe and Others Group of Countries
WFP	United Nations World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

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