



Security Together: A Unified Supply and Demand Approach to Small Arms Control

Working Paper February 2005

Quaker United Nations Office



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Introduction

Please note that this document is a work in progress. In upcoming months QUNO and its partners will be continuing a programme of research and consultation on many different aspects of small arms demand. We intend to revise and develop our conclusions as information becomes available.

For the last decade the Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO) has been an active participant in efforts to control the proliferation and destructive impact of small arms and light weapons. As the issue developed it became evident to QUNO and a number of other partner agencies that the emerging international small arms control programme was inadequately addressing the human perceptions and the political, social and economic forces that were creating the demand for these weapons and fuelling their proliferation. Our small arms work during this period has therefore had as its major goal a better understanding of these demand factors, of approaches that contribute to the reduction of the demand for small arms, and of how supply and demand related policies must be pursued in an integrated way. We have not been alone in this. For example, a number of multilateral agencies, national governments, NGOs and others have also been addressing the demand dimension of small arms control and have themselves reported extensively on the integration of these issues into their own field programmes. Of particular note, the Small Arms Survey began a focused research partnership with QUNO in 2003 that will eventually encompass a more comprehensive overview of small arms practice and concepts.

The aim of this document is three-fold: 1) to demonstrate the crucial relationship between small arms demand and supply approaches; 2) to provide a summary of our findings on developments in policy and practice related to reducing small arms demand; and 3) to present a set of recommendations related to what we see as crucial parts of the emerging small arms demand agenda. With the UN moving towards a full review conference in 2006 on its Programme of Action (POA) on small arms, we feel

that this is an important moment to be presenting these findings and recommendations. The material presented here is based on the results of a series of workshops and consultations organized by QUNO and its partners, and on studies and reports by other agencies active in development, peacebuilding and small arms control.

The text is divided into four main sections:

- ***Part One describes the current development of thinking on demand.*** It argues that a unified supply-demand approach is needed to control the impacts of small arms violence and that activities need more emphasis on affecting the attitudes and perceptions of people who choose to acquire, possess and use small arms (the demand side). Some development agencies are already pursuing such a unified approach. A model for understanding demand-side factors is presented, focusing on individual and group *preferences* for weapons, on the relative *prices* for weapons and on the relative *resources* available for their acquisition.
- ***Part Two provides a fuller description of practical small arms demand programming.*** It begins with an overview of five key approaches that are pursued by demand projects: Critical Identities; Gender Mainstreaming and Positive Engagement of Youth; Governance and Security; Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Reconciliation; Assuring Effective Post-Conflict Reintegration; and Conflict-Sensitive Development. The nature of each of these approaches is explained. The practical implementation of work adopting such approaches is illustrated by descriptions of projects from Latin America, North America, Africa, Europe and the Pacific.
- ***Part Three provides a summary of policy recommendations on small arms demand gathered from many different sources.*** This part begins with references to places in the 2001 UN Programme of Action (POA) where the importance of demand factors in the control of small arms is clearly recognized and recommendations made. A longer list of suggested policy directions, drawing on a range of sources and experience, is then presented, organized under the headings relating to the five key approaches. A sixth category focuses on the need for improved coordination and better research support.
- ***Part Four lists resources, including published reports and Internet sites, that cover the main aspects of small arms demand research and policy.***

1. Understanding the Demand for Small Arms and Light Weapons

a) A Unified Approach to Shrinking Small Arms Violence

Supply and Demand

This year hundreds of thousands of people will be killed by small arms and many others injured. These casualties will result from the use of a weapons system that consists of two primary parts: the weapon itself and the person who aims and fires it. Much of the regional and international policymaking on small arms since the mid-1990's has focused on the gun part of this dynamic: for example, addressing proliferation with supply-side measures such as transfer controls. At the same time, though it has been slow to enter the global policymaking discourse, work to affect the other side of the dynamic – the attitudes and perceptions of people who choose to acquire, possess and use small arms – has been a surprisingly common focus of activity in field programmes. It is now past time to bring these two strands together into a unified approach.

The understanding that weapons and their users must be addressed together for action on small arms to be effective is a principle already in use by many community-level practitioners. They recognize that control programmes must deal with both the access to weapons (supply) and the motivations by members of the community for the possession and use of weapons (demand). Demand programmes are seen not as diversions from supply-related programmes, but rather as complementary to them and critical to the success of control efforts. Our argument here, which we support with evidence, is that the question for the international community is not *whether* to address the demand for small arms, or *if* supply aspects should be addressed first. Rather, the question

must be how can control programmes adequately address the interdependent aspects of supply and demand? What are the crucial elements that must be in place for a unified supply and demand approach to small arms control?

Interventions along the Small Arms Chain¹

Supply and demand for weapons should be viewed as inter-related variables along the full continuum that stretches from their original 'production' to their 'end use' on the ground. Figure 1 traces a possible interpretation of this continuum, or chain.

Conventional approaches to understanding supply conceive of interventions (i.e., efforts at arms control or disarmament) as actions taken at different points along this chain. At each stage of the chain, specific actions are elaborated that might reduce or control the stocks and flows of weapons – from conversion in the manufacturing sector to the marking and tracing of individual firearms – with the ultimate aim of reducing their availability. Conceptually, all the mechanisms articulated in the UN POA can be aligned along this chain.

The demand for weapons is also evident at all points along the chain. A unified approach that incorporates motivations and means would focus on a reverse view of the chain. It would ask, at each stage of the continuum, what factors influence the flow of weapons? For example, at the end-user point on the continuum, an array of variables can be seen to influence the choices made by civilians, armed groups and state forces in acquiring weapons. Moving back along the chain, other demand factors may be seen to stimulate the movement of weapons at each stage as they are traded, brokered, leaked from stockpiles and manufactured.

This framework draws attention not only to the conventional understanding of the mutually dependent relationship between supply and demand, but also to the need, when suggesting policy directions, to take into account both supply and demand variables along the chain. Understanding demand, therefore, requires more than making a list of mitigating or independent factors or influences. It requires a shift in traditional arms control and disarmament thinking when applied to policy interventions.

Policy Integration

Current peacebuilding and development policy trends already point to the importance of controlling

1. This discussion draws on David Atwood and Robert Muggah (2004) "Motivations and means: The Critical Element of 'Demand' for Small Arms Action," paper prepared for the *Putting People First II* project, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva.

Figure 1: The Small Arms Chain

'production' >>> 'stockpiles and stockpile management' >>> 'brokering' >>> 'trade and transfer' >>> 'end-use'

armed violence (much of it carried out with small arms), in particular by addressing the human conflicts that underlie many outbreaks of violence. Recent studies of international peacebuilding practice and reports on progress toward reaching the Millennium Development Goals underline the need to focus efforts on reducing violence and finding alternative means and structures for the expression of political and social differences.

Increasingly, development processes are being seen as part of a wider conflict prevention system. As the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change recently stated: "Development has to be the first line of defence for a collective security system that takes prevention seriously. Combating poverty will not only save millions of lives but also strengthen States' capacity to combat terrorism, organized crime and weapons proliferation."² But the converse is also equally true, that the ability of the international community to achieve its development goals is dependent in part on controlling violent conflicts. Many less-developed societies are in regions heavily affected by armed violence and attendant instability. This violence obstructs poverty alleviation, deters investment, restricts food production, undermines livelihoods, obstructs access to schools, strains limited health services and disrupts efforts to promote gender equality and empower women. In recognition of this relationship between poverty and armed conflict, development agencies are emphasizing a unified approach that includes controlling both the supply and demand for small arms. The UN Development Programme (UNDP), for example, supports a wide array of programmes that seek to reduce the demand for guns and the opportunities for their use, and offers alternative, non-violent avenues toward security, sustainable livelihoods, and development opportunities.

New Steps In Understanding Demand

Although only briefly recognized explicitly in the UN Programme of Action (POA) on small arms³, there is in fact an emerging body of analysis, tools, and practice that is used in approaching the effective reduction of civilian demand for small arms. Developed through intensive work by multilateral agencies and a variety of NGOs and governments over the past decade, these resources include:

- a **conceptual model** that describes small arms demand as a system of inter-related preferences, resources and price functions, enabling an analyst to evaluate the possible security impacts of policy alternatives, socio-economic conditions and personal attitudes.
- a set of **five key approaches** that can be seen to affect small arms demand, including: Critical Identities; Gender Mainstreaming and Positive Engagement of Youth; Governance and Security; Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Reconciliation; Assuring Effective Post-Conflict Reintegration; and Conflict-Sensitive Development.
- a growing **breadth of experience** with multi-dimensional programmes from every region in countries in the midst of violent conflict, post-conflict or "at peace".
- the beginnings of **detailed evaluative research** by the Small Arms Survey, UNDP, WHO and others to assess existing demand programming and guide new developments.

A New Policy Consensus for 2006

Now that there is a much more established base for a unified approach to small arms control that includes both supply- and demand-side elements, it is important to incorporate these perspectives into the emerging global consensus on small arms. This integrated thinking can play a larger role in national and regional action programmes and in the assistance plans provided by international donors. Indeed, the foundation for this integration is already in place. A number of significant demand-related priorities and actions are already implied by the UN POA and could be developed more fully in any new consensus documents.

2. UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) "A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Executive Summary," United Nations, New York, p. 2. www.un.org/secureworld/brochure.pdf.
3. Published as the "Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, New York, 9–20 July, 2001," UN Document A/CONF.192/15. This is the basic consensus on agreed global approaches to small arms control.

b) The Demand Model: Preferences, Prices and Resources

Understanding how demand dynamics relate to supply factors has been assisted by the development by Muggah and Brauer of a simple but powerful theoretical model for conceiving demand.⁴ This model suggests that there are three key interacting variables shaping demand: individual and group *preferences* for weapons; *prices* (monetary and non-monetary) of weapons; and *resources* available for obtaining weapons.

Most demand discussions have so far tended to focus on the *preferences* variable.⁵ Demand from this perspective is seen as a cluster of mutually reinforcing social, cultural, economic and political factors influencing preferences for owning a weapon. It can, for example, be a function of inherited and socially constructed ideas about masculinity, a clear and seemingly rational desire for self-protection, or a means to fulfil a legitimate livelihood option. There can be multiple preferences operating at the same time. One key point is that preferences are dynamic. For example, a homeowner's preference for regarding a weapon as necessary for family protection may change if s/he feels a community-watch scheme is now providing sufficient security, even as his/her deep preference—for security for his/her family—remains an important motivating concern. It is also important to recognize that preferences are not necessarily confined to the individual, but can also be collectively realized

However, the unpacking of individual and collective preferences alone is not sufficient for understanding the demand for weapons. The extent to which the preference for acquiring a gun can be realized is a function also of the real and relative *price* of the gun in a particular setting, and the availability and price of acceptable substitutes. These factors are inherently related to supply factors. Where gun prices are relatively high, this suggests a strong preference for weapons and a limited supply. *Price* can also be understood in both monetary and non-monetary ways. For example, the relative price of an AK-47 in a particular setting may be high if the social cost of acquiring it is high due to well-enforced penalties for illegal possession.

4. See Robert Muggah and Jurgen Brauer (2004) "Diagnosing Small-Arms Demand: A Multi-disciplinary Approach," *Discussion Paper No. 50*, Department of Economics and Management, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

5. The discussion below draws on Atwood and Muggah (2004).

Preferences and price are similarly related to relative *resources*. One may have a high preference for obtaining a weapon and the price may be low, but if personal or group resources are lacking, demand cannot be fulfilled. Resources may be monetary resources, but also exchangeable commodities (e.g., animals, timber and even women), as well as such resources as organizational capacity, access to enabling networks (e.g., weapons brokers), and even weapons themselves (as tools for obtaining income or for stealing other weapons).

This analysis shows that a complex constellation of relationships is at work in shaping demand in any particular setting. Moreover, the model reveals how particular policy choices or interventions, if uninformed by an understanding of all three factors, can produce unintended consequences. For example, economic incentive schemes aimed at providing alternatives to an involvement in criminality may merely increase the resources available for the purchase of weapons (i.e., the relative price of weapons will fall), thus possibly driving up demand, if preferences—for example, the 'macho' symbolism of automatic weapons in some cultural settings—are not simultaneously addressed. Moreover, in some communities, the choice to acquire a weapon is not necessarily rendered individually, but influenced by a series of collective decision-making processes.

Such a model permits us to make useful hypotheses about the possible effects of specific supply *and* demand interventions and to test our predictions against the results obtained in the field. The Small Arms Survey is currently testing in a rigorous way the explanatory value of the use of this model in relation to small arms demand reduction interventions in three settings.

c) A Unified Small Arms Approach and Achieving the Millennium Development Goals

As noted above, there is considerable discussion in the global community about the practical integration of conflict prevention, security and development policy. Development relates to conflict in two ways. On the one hand development can itself act as part of a wider conflict prevention system by reducing disparities and increasing collective well-being. On the other hand violent conflict can hinder, prevent, or destroy development gains. But even some states

Supply, Demand and Development in Cambodia

The EU ASAC13 small arms programme in Cambodia has developed a number of linkages between small arms controls and poverty reduction, including linking weapons collection and destruction with community development programmes. Success was not only measured in numbers of weapons collected and destroyed, but by qualitative assessments such as improved community security, changes in attitudes towards gun possession and empowerment of marginalized groups such as women. In some areas, programmes were deemed successful even if many weapons remained hidden or buried rather than carried.⁶

that are strong advocates of the UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) do not yet see the necessary connection between the success of this process and the establishment of a more effective, unified approach to small arms controls. This has led to a narrow pursuit of the existing and largely supply-oriented provisions in the UN POA. Recently, reports by the UN Secretary General, the UN Panel on High Level Threats, Challenges and Change, and an earlier, ground breaking consultation hosted by the UK Department for International Development (DfID) have made the case for a necessary linkage between achieving the MDGs and creating a more integrated and effective small arms control regime. It is worth looking at these in some detail.

In his 2004 report on implementing the MDGs, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan linked the programme's progress to lessening the impact of disasters, including those caused by armed violence:

Interventions geared towards mitigating the adverse effects of disasters and crises are a vital part of efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. After all, it is the poor, the vulnerable and the oppressed who are most affected by environmental degradation, natural hazards or the eruption of violent conflict. They are also the most likely to suffer the consequences in the form of death and displacement and the systematic loss of development gains.⁷

The report, emphasizing the crucial importance of controlling armed violence, devotes its long opening section to the impacts of security failures on development. The list of crises described includes the continued fighting in Iraq, the repeated eruption of terrorist attacks across the globe, and the ongoing violence and instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, the Occupied Palestinian

Territory, Colombia, among others. The humanitarian disaster in Darfur received special attention because it so clearly "strikes at the very heart of the ideals of the Charter of the United Nations and the Millennium Declaration."

All of the conflict situations highlighted by the Secretary-General are being fought largely, and in some cases exclusively, with small arms and light weapons. So there is a direct link between controlling the supply of and demand for these weapons and the success of the MDGs.

An earlier conference report published by DfID explores these connections at length, as illustrated by the following examples:⁸

Regarding the goal of halving the proportion of people suffering from extreme poverty and hunger:

- A high proportion of the poorest countries in the world, where large parts of the population suffer extreme poverty and hunger, are also those that are in or emerging from prolonged armed conflicts.
- In many countries that have not suffered large scale armed conflict, high levels of gun violence obstruct poverty alleviation, deter investment, restrict food production and distribution, and undermine livelihoods in both rural and urban areas.

Regarding education goals:

- Eighty-two percent of the 113 million children out of school live in crisis or post-crisis countries.
- Across the world, gun availability directly contributes to violence and insecurity in or obstructs access to schools, limiting progress on the education MDGs.

Regarding health goals:

- Armed violence places enormous strains on health services, diverting scarce resources from programmes to achieve the MDGs to reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, and combat HIV/AIDS and other diseases.

6. "Tackling Poverty by Reducing Armed Violence" (2003) UK Department for International Development, United Kingdom, London, p. 18.

7. "Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration: Report of the Secretary-General" (2004) UN Document A/59/282, United Nations, 27 August 2004, p. 20.

8. "Tackling Poverty by Reducing Armed Violence" (2003) The Department for International Development, United Kingdom, London, pp. 8–10. This analysis is based on a paper commissioned by DfID from Owen Greene, "How is SALW control a development issue?" University of Bradford, UK, April 2003, www.brad.ac.uk/adac/cics/.

Regarding gender goals:

- The impacts of small arms availability and misuse tend to differ between men and women, with severe implications for the MDGs to promote gender equality and empower women.
- Sexual violence at gunpoint and domestic gun violence are particular risks for women, and in many societies women bear the brunt of the impacts of gun deaths and injuries on their families and communities.

Integrating Supply and Demand Programming

This concern over the impacts of small arms violence already informs development programming on the ground where agencies emphasize a unified approach that includes controlling both the supply and demand for small arms. The UN Development Programme (UNDP), for example, describes its programme this way:

Where small arms related violence prevents development, UNDP's key concern is to provide programmes that reduce the demand for guns and the opportunities for their use, and offer other avenues toward security, sustainable livelihoods, and development opportunities.

Particularly in the aftermath of violent conflict, UNDP provides immediate means for the disarmament and demobilization and generates sustainable solutions for the peaceable re-integration of former-combatants.⁹

A closer look at UNDP's field activities demonstrates that they neatly integrate objectives that tackle both supply and demand aspects by efforts to:

- Promote coordinated, development-focused approaches to control and reduce armed violence;
- Increase capacity around the globe for small arms reduction and demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants, in order to help reduce armed violence;
- Decrease the availability of illicit small arms and provide alternatives to armed violence
- Raise international awareness of the development costs of small arms proliferation and the militarization of society."¹⁰

Clearly, momentum is building to bring security, including small arms control efforts, under the rubric of development, and to establish an integrated supply–demand framework for small arms violence prevention efforts. It is now worthwhile examining how these developments are actually playing out in practice.

9. UNDP web site: www.undp.org.

10. "UNDP's Role in Addressing Armed Violence and the Demobilization of Ex-Combatants" on the UNDP web site, www.undp.org.

2. Practical Steps to Tackling Demand

a) Five Key Approaches

A review of the reports and discussions from QUNO's long series of small arms demand workshops suggests a number of "windows" through which communities frame their experiences of small arms violence and associated demand for weapons. These are conflict, development, human rights, post-war recovery and governance. Participants reported that community members fear the outbreak of violence or the inability to end active warfare (i.e., conflict and post-war recovery issues) or other threats to their physical safety and livelihoods. Generally they see the root causes of this violence in poverty, lack of employment, poor infrastructure (i.e., in development issues) and in a social-legal system that does not support their basic rights (i.e., in governance issues).

In addition, participants usually emphasized that three groups of community members stand out as critically affected: young males, because they are most vulnerable to recruitment into armed violence (and paradoxically to overcoming it); adult males, because they are socialized to be the predominant gun owners and users; and women, because they are socialized *not* to own or use weapons and are often more ready to initiate actions against gun possession or misuse.

From these responses, QUNO has identified five crucial approaches to policy development. Two of these are concerned with understanding the broader environment in which small arms demand occurs:

- Critical Identities: Gender Mainstreaming and Positive Engagement of Youth; and
- Governance and Security.

Three others address demand programming more directly through:

- Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Reconciliation;
- Assuring Effective Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration; and
- Conflict-Sensitive Development.

Interestingly, this list is confirmed by looking at the UN PoA itself, which, while it contains only one explicit reference to demand issues, includes many indirect references, most of which would fit neatly under the five topics listed immediately above. (*See Section 3a below for more on the PoA.*)

i) Critical Identities

Gender Mainstreaming¹¹

Gun violence is a particularly gendered phenomenon; across cultures it is largely men who perpetrate interpersonal violence against women and other men. This is not to say all men are innately violent or pro-gun, or that all men accept the status quo. It is also well known that women may incite men to greater aggression, support institutions that rely on violence, or use violence to achieve their own goals.

Violence and the means to commit violence are, however, both masculinised and institutionalised: elite men preside over the domains of military research and weapons development, and are the decision-makers in the preparation for and the waging of war. Women, by contrast, have been excluded from taking leading roles in security sectors the world over. This has not prevented them from struggling both to find peaceful solutions to problems and to make their voices heard. They have mobilised for disarmament even when the contexts in which they live make them equally (or more) vulnerable than men to violence and other risks to their safety.

It is important to think about *which* men are most vulnerable to taking up arms, and whose interests are served when they do. During wars, men and boys, often from impoverished racial/ethnic minorities, are actively encouraged or coerced into being combatants. In peacetime it is usually poor, marginalized men who take up jobs in the security sector, or end up in armed gangs. Small arms become synonymous with male status and are perceived as the best tools for making social and economic gains.

In contrast, women often make use of social and cultural ideas of femininity to open spaces in which to build peace. Universally, they take a central role in violence prevention efforts. In conflict zones women are not only victims, but can also be courageous actors during wartime and uniquely placed organizers in the aftermath.

11. This section draws extensively on the paper by Vanessa Farr (2004) "Women, Men and Gun Violence," prepared for the *Putting People First II* project, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva.

Because of all these factors, women and men often see the question of arms acquisition in starkly different ways. Nevertheless, both views are equally valid and need to be given attention in violence prevention and peacebuilding efforts. Unfortunately, since men are primarily associated with owning and using guns, women are often not consulted in security-related processes. A more balanced gender approach to armed violence prevention is needed, one that includes an understanding of how violence is experienced differently by men and women in each specific context, and that ensures that both sexes play important roles in the development and implementation of efforts to reduce access to and demand for small arms.

Positive Engagement of Youth

“Adults should be listening to child soldiers and young people as key stake holders in negotiations to end conflict . . . Children’s involvement is crucial not only to build a lasting peace but in all aspects of the dialogue between civil society and governments.”¹²

A comment from a workshop participant in Southeast Asia identified a priority shared by many of the groups represented at the QUNO consultations: “Most crucially there must be a focus on what must be done to eliminate the alienation experienced by young people. A particular focus is required for young unemployed men in a variety of settings. Major work is required on this issue to understand how to reintegrate young men back into societies which are not necessarily prepared to receive them.”¹³

Children and youth have a central role to play in small arms issues. First, they are a very large part of the population of each country and the attitudes they take and alternatives they seek will increasingly determine the directions of their societies. Second, youth and children are the most vulnerable part of the population to recruitment into armed groups—whether army, paramilitary, militias, or criminal gangs.¹⁴ Chronic warfare, disease, political conflict, poverty and injustice all result in the marginalization and even abandonment of young people. So if violence, instability and demand for weapons in the region are to be lessened, there must be a focus

12. *Child Soldiers: The Global Report 2004*, London: Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, p. 28.

13. Cate Buchanan and David Atwood (2002) ‘Curbing the Demand for Small Arms: Focus on Southeast Asia,’ Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva, p. 41.

14. For more on the reasons why children join armed groups see: Rachel Brett and Irma Specht (2004) *Young Soldiers: Why They Choose to Fight*, Lynne Reiner, Boulder.

on addressing the needs and attitudes of young people. Third, and more positively, young people are often in the forefront of efforts to reduce violence and participation in armed conflict.

Successful youth programmes aimed at establishing and reinforcing non-violent attitudes and responsible citizenship are being conducted by civil society in many regions. The activities conducted are surprisingly similar and include sports, music and other arts, computer training, academic tutoring, job training, entrepreneurial support and micro-credit, activities aimed at encouraging youth participation as well as capacity building. The direct involvement of community police staff in some programmes (e.g., sports) increases trust between police and the community they serve.

Most of the projects described have found that dealing with the root causes of youth violence leads away from an emphasis on criminal justice and punitive responses and towards interrelated actions in economic and social development, education and alternative forms of non-violent conflict resolution (e.g., communication training, peer mediation, victim-offender mediation). These actions are carried out in the context of the community’s understanding that it is confronting a shared involvement in a wider “culture of violence.” A number of the projects have chosen to integrate a specific police reform programme – community policing – with associated youth programming. This strategy aims to involve a defined community in collaboration with the police to provide a greater sense of security.

ii) Governance and Security

QUNO participants highlighted a key factor in insecurity and demand for weapons that was particularly difficult for them to address: violence that is generated by an unstable security sector, or one that is poorly controlled. These issues are often subsumed under systemic problems relating to governance, rule of law, and the enforcement of domestic and international human rights and humanitarian laws.

The positive impact of law depends on how effectively it is enforced. Often laws are not well enforced due to insufficient training of local police, customs officers or border guards. In other cases, corruption and abuse by officials actually work to fuel demand for arms.

Police forces can set the tone for violence or peace in a community. The routine excessive use of force by police and other state security or administrative

agencies provides strong negative models to communities and may increase demand for weapons for self-protection and counter reaction. Marginalization, prejudices and stereotypes expressed by public servants or others against a particular population may alienate a community, stimulate violence and become a further reason for civilians to acquire guns for their own protection. The recent global initiatives supporting Security Sector Reform (SSR) are very relevant to ending abuse of civilians by government forces. Increased professionalism, respect for human rights, resistance to corruption and the placing of armed forces under civilian control, all feature in SSR programmes and have a direct impact on increasing public trust and lowering demand for guns.

Community policing and “restorative justice” programmes can often be effective approaches to arms demand reduction, but finding appropriate police staff to lead a community policing programme is essential for success. Observers emphasize that such programmes are not typical policing and they often run counter to the organizational culture of local police forces. The concept of community policing represents a major change in aims and activities and its implementation requires leadership that emphasizes communication, personal involvement, imagination and adaptability.

There is a growing trend for states unable to provide professional security services to instead arm selected members of civilian communities, or to extend their franchise on the use of force to private security companies. This practice can be seen to have negative security consequences and to increase the demand for weapons. In many situations it has been used to justify the acquisition of arms by other community groupings, who themselves feel threatened by these newly armed elements.¹⁵

iii) Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Reconciliation

Many programmes working to lessen the demand for small arms include aspects of conflict resolution work in their strategies, because the perceived need among civilians for small arms is often based on their fear of violence spawned by unresolved disputes. In this view, conflicts develop because the community has little capacity to intervene non-violently. This deficit can lead to violence because the parties have no strategy for resolving their differences except by resorting to violence.

In response, security, church, peace, and development organizations have launched a wide variety of conflict management programmes in areas heavily affected by small arms violence. The programmes are aimed at preparing individuals, groups and institutions to analyse conflict processes with a view to intervening at an early stage, when non-violent dialogue and negotiation processes are most likely to find success. To prepare communities to carry out such programmes, individuals and groups are trained in basic peacemaking and conflict resolution skills and traditional indigenous conflict management processes are often supported or revived. Other programmes attempt to lift the burden of traumatic stress that victims of previous violence continue to carry. In situations where violence is imminent or has already broken out, experienced teams of mediators are dispatched to promote negotiations among warring groups.

More recently, conflict management and peace organizations have widened their focus from immediate conflict intervention activity to including work on longer-term reconciliation processes. They apply trauma healing, personal reflection, and citizenship programmes to begin affecting the self-image and identity of people who have been exposed to violent conflict, abuse, injustice and ethnic discrimination – whether as victims, perpetrators or both. These programmes are sometimes seen as the necessary first step preceding larger reconciliation processes.

Finally, it is widely recognized that broader peace education programmes can lead to a greater public awareness of peace alternatives and help establish an attitude change that favours non-violent conflict resolution.

iv) Assuring Effective Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

Actions carried out by formal peace operations can be crucial to setting the public perceptions of security in post-war societies. In turn, these perceptions significantly affect small arms demand, as felt both by former combatants and by civilians. In perhaps its most direct recognition of the need to integrate demand factors into small arms weapons controls, the POA includes direct mention of the importance of effective Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinte-

15. A number of examples of this phenomenon can be found in (2001) “Curbing the Demand for Small Arms: Lessons in East Africa and the Horn of Africa-Nairobi, Kenya, December 12–15, 2000,” Quaker UN Office, New York and Geneva, pp. 15–17.

gration (DDR) programmes in the control of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. DDR policy is being extensively reformed through efforts launched both within and outside the UN. The UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR views the process as an holistic strategy using an integrated security and development approach with a focus on lowering the impact of violence on the ground. This approach is a close complement to small arms control initiatives that focus on reducing demand and supply in a unified way.

The early and responsible involvement of civil society in the planning and implementation of all the stages of a peace operation will much more likely assure that it will contribute to a stable post-war environment. Civil society organizations with a capacity to contribute concretely to peacemaking and DDR programmes have already found a place as specialized advisors in Guatemala, as facilitators of pre-negotiation processes in Sierra Leone and in ceasefire monitoring in the Philippines. UNIFEM has developed specific policies for the involvement of women in peace processes and has identified an extensive network of women peacemakers at national levels that could be integrated into DDR planning and implementation. Organizations with a clear capacity to deliver development programming, particularly in support of alternative livelihoods for ex-combatants, can play an important part in the reintegration stage of DDR.

Disarming combatants quickly is crucial to stopping hostilities, preventing new violence, and lessening the demand for guns. Unfortunately, some of the common gun collection processes have not worked well. Gun buy-back programmes have been disastrous in some cases and have led to expanded gun trafficking. The use of voluntary gun surrender based on a fixed minimum (e.g., one gun per ex-combatant) has ignored the many unarmed members of combatant groups, and have left too many guns in circulation.

Lessons learned exercises repeatedly report that reintegration programmes are under-funded or inadequately scaled for the conditions faced on the ground. The inadequate reintegration of ex-combatants has led, in some situations, to the re-recruitment of fighters, banditry, destabilization of political and civil life and a pervasive instability that itself breeds an increasing demand for weapons.

The crucial focus of reintegration should be on short and medium term programs that the host society needs in order to sustain peace and order while the longer term process of economic rebuilding is

being initiated. This includes at least three dimensions: an economic side that uses transitional employment options to prevent ex-combatants from returning to violent and criminal activity; a social side that offers a visible, reliable and accountable justice system in the post-war environment before longer term SSR programmes can start; and a governance side that emphasizes local, inclusive, participatory decision making as part of a reform of government.

Reintegration programmes may be seen as 'compensation' for fighting and thus may raise issues for those who did not participate in war and may be jealous of the seed money and training that ex-combatants receive. One answer may be in involving the community in communication and oversight tasks, so it sees itself as an eventual beneficiary of the process, while at the same time providing ex-combatants with training, grants and micro-business support that gives them a stake in peace.

v) Conflict-Sensitive Development

The participants in the QUNO workshops uniformly viewed sustainable development as the main means of responding to root causes of small arms demand. Their programmes address such issues as poverty, economic development, community empowerment, inclusion of women and youth in decision-making, protection of vulnerable populations, education and opportunities for self-betterment and self-confidence. This is true both in developed as well as developing countries.

Participants also pointed to state policies that fail to recognise the basic rights of local people as a critical factor in many types of conflict. When rights to self-determination, land, resources and freedom are denied, a key result is the recourse to power through the threat or use of weapons. The demand for small arms needs to be addressed in this context.

Of course, each community offers different challenges to control efforts. Consequently, a thorough understanding is needed of the cultural, economic and political dynamics of each community for such efforts to have sustainable and binding yields. Community surveys to determine what these important stakeholders want and need are critical for shaping project development. Participatory assessments are an essential first step to gauge the parameters of potential support, willingness to change, unforeseen obstacles and ownership of the process and outcomes. These surveys can provide qualitative input about people's perceptions of the problem and

how they regard the programming aimed at tackling the problem. Many participants stressed that all stakeholders should be included in a community dialogue on security. Even those who perpetrate gun violence and other criminality are essential to the process and may eventually be recruited into community programmes.

Successful long-term projects are multi-dimensional in nature. The example cited below of the Viva Rio programme in a *favela* (shantytown) in Rio de Janeiro demonstrates this approach. It uses a minimum core of integrated elements – drawn from development, policing and human rights practice – as an essential strategic planning concept.

b) Some Promising Demand Reduction Programmes

The past ten years have witnessed a significant expansion of initiatives aimed at reducing weapons and armed violence. The UNDP alone supports more than 45 on-going micro-disarmament projects in over 40 countries. The World Bank has financed and overseen dozens of DDR projects. NGOs and community-based development agencies have initiated literally thousands of projects and programmes addressing gun availability in order to contribute to the improvement of community safety and well-being. While not explicitly using the term ‘demand’, many of these programmes have nevertheless been focused on affecting needs and motivations of individuals and groups. The following project descriptions illustrate the wide variety of multi-dimensional programmes that have been initiated and their adaptation to differing local conditions and opportunities.

i) Development, community policing and youth education to deal with drug gangs in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

This pilot project designed and implemented by the NGO Viva Rio is an excellent example of a multi-dimensional demand project focused on drawing young people away from participation in armed drug gangs. First, over a one-year period the organizers carried out interviews with children involved in or exposed to violence in *favelas* (hillside slums) and jails. This information was collated with that from official sources to create a mapping of violent acts, the typical profile of children and youth involved, the specific age group most at risk, the attitudes of

the youth toward violence and the perceived causes of the phenomenon. Based on this information Viva Rio designed a programme with three interrelated components:

- Youth alternatives – a macro-programme for all children that concentrates on positive alternative activity: sports, artistic activity, fast-track education programmes, job training and placement. In addition, a micro-programme focuses on youth that are already engaged in violence and uses membership in a special boxing club as a basis for building self-confidence and positive self image.
- Community policing – a completely new, community-based force was set up in one target *favela* with a specially chosen leader and staff selected for their integrity and dedication to law and community. This was supported by two initiatives: a) investing in police training; and b) developing a community-based oversight of the new police unit, including a community council in the *favela* to dialogue with the police about security and development issues.
- Integration of the pilot programme into a city-wide, multi-dimensional effort that includes lobbying government, public demonstrations and attitudinal campaigns, and provision of training and research assistance to police agencies.

After a decade of work, the level of gun violence in Rio de Janeiro has stopped increasing and community policing and youth programmes are being applied in new sections of the city.¹⁶

ii) Using Indigenous Conflict Management Processes in Garissa, Kenya

Using traditional methods of conflict resolution and peacemaking, the Pastoralist Peace and Development Initiative (PPDI), a community-based organization, was established by local leaders and youth groups in 1998 with the objective of understanding the origins and dynamics of the conflicts in the largely-Somali Garissa region. PPDI observed that while cattle raiding and banditry contributed to underdevelopment in the region, poverty and access to resources and grazing

16. Adapted from David Jackman (2003) “Lessons on Small Arms Demand and Youth: A Summary from ‘Small Arms Demand in the Caribbean: Special Focus on Haiti and Youth Issues’ 8–13 June 2003, Port-au-Prince, Haiti,” Quaker UN Office, Geneva, 2003, pp. 8–9. For a more thorough description and evaluation see Luke Dowdney (2003) *Children of the Drug Trade: A Case Study of Children in Organised Armed Violence in Rio de Janeiro*, Rio de Janeiro: 7 Letras].

land crucially contributed to the conflicts in the region. These conflicts themselves are linked to the struggle for political, social and economic power among different clan groupings.

National Kenyan systems of policing and justice were perceived to be of little effect or relevance by the people in the region. Yet there was history of traditional forms of governance, although much had been forgotten or was no longer respected. PDDI has worked to re-build traditional methods of conflict resolution and to harmonize the traditional and Kenyan national systems.

Slowly, the Government is now coming to see the important role that such traditional methods can play in establishing rule of law in the region and is officially recognizing the place of groups such as Councils of Elders. Under a cooperative approach, cases involving crimes committed by Somalis are handed back to the clans, with the elders doing the follow-up. As a revival of this method in Wajir district has shown, involving all the stakeholders has proven to be a strong method of solving conflict among the clans. The strengthening of the traditional methods also means that elders are better able to convince bandits in the bush to surrender their firearms.

iii) Economic Development in a Divided City: Belfast, Northern Ireland

In the early 1990s, a consortium of three community organisations (North Belfast Peacebuilding Network, Inter Community Development Association, and Linc Resource Centre) identified a need for conducting local work that would imbue confidence in the main political peace process in Northern Ireland. Their joint project recognised the primacy of dialogue between the two communities, Loyalist and Republican, the main parties to the violent conflict. They chose to focus on the underlying economic problems experienced by both groups, because both communities suffered high levels of long-term unemployment. People living along the interfaces between the communities were more likely to be disadvantaged. Inter-community conflict was perceived as a normal part of life.

Intercomm was initiated in 1994 by two men who worked for two community organisations, one (Loyalist) to reintegrate ex-para-militaries back in the community, the other (Catholic) on economic development issues. The cease-fires provided political momentum and opportunities for the communities to work together. Their emphasis was on building

human relations first by identifying key individuals and giving them skills in conflict management. Their model was based somewhat on the network of (ex-combatant) peace promoters in Managua, Nicaragua. The project emphasized educating people to have confidence in themselves, its strategy recognizing that people have to be secure in their own identity before they can interact positively with the 'other side.'

This approach grew and became multi-faceted. Intercomm ran a youth programme on masculinity and violence, worked on peace education and peace promotion and initiated construction projects. The programme started building projects in order to make their work sustainable and to build resources into the community. Their vision was to create eventually an integrated work force that could build up the community together.

iv) Post-war Peace Education and Reconciliation in Bujumbura, Burundi

For more than a decade the Burundian people experienced the intense violence of a civil war. Killings, looting and displacement of populations were commonplace. Poverty and illiteracy were pervasive and the population easily manipulated by political leaders. Recently, the country has begun a process toward peace accords and transitional institutions. Nevertheless, the population was heavily affected by the trauma of war – exile, poverty, rape, torture, killings and maiming – and these memories were limiting the possibilities for a successful peace. In 2003 Search for Common Ground (SFCG) began a programme to support victims of torture and rape by military forces. This work was carried out in coalition with human rights and peacemaking groups. It brought victims together to reduce their marginalization and provided group and individual counselling, legal assistance, accompaniment, capacity building and resettlement support.

Peace education was a major emphasis of SFCG's work, directed at linking communities that had been divided. The organization identified local leaders, provided training in leadership and conflict management and later worked with these leaders on local peace strategies. At times this work was carried out with partner organizations and community elders to support their influence. In 2004 a "Heroes Summit," produced for radio by Studio Ijambo, recognized the heroic peace deeds carried out across the identity divide between Hutu and Tutsi communities.

SFCG programmes are bottom-up in emphasis. This approach brings a wide range of views to their meetings and helps to begin closing the gap between people and government. Such meetings intentionally involve members of conflicting groups. This breaks what was once a taboo and is part of ending the silence and exclusion caused by fear and trauma. It has been SFCG's experience that the level of community violence goes down when people see that dialogue can be an alternative to fighting.

v) Peace Agreement, Reconciliation, and Drug Programmes in Papua New Guinea¹⁷

Though popularly perceived as a heavily armed society, there are comparatively few commercially manufactured firearms in Papua New Guinea. There is, however, a wide variety of weapons available and they are being used to devastating effect. Tribal violence in the capital of the Southern Highlands, Mendi, peaked to unprecedented levels between 2001 and 2002. At least 120 men and women, primarily from two tribes, were shot and killed and hundreds more intentionally wounded. During previous inter-communal conflicts waged with bows and arrows or bladed weapons, as few as one or two people were seriously or fatally injured. In the absence of government support, a transparent process of reconciliation and a subsequent informal peace agreement were organised by a number of faith based organisations. The agreement, brokered in May 2002, offered closure to the three-year conflict. Commitments were signed to, among other things, "dismiss" mercenary gunmen, entrust all firearms to local leaders, cease the public display of offensive weapons and co-operate with police to restrict alcohol and marijuana abuse – widely perceived as catalysts to influencing individual and collective *preferences* for weapons. Though preferences for weapons remain, the real and relative *price* of weapons has risen with no concomitant increase in *resources*. As such, demand has been reduced. More than two years after its signature at a public ceremony attended by more than 10,000 people, the Mendi Peace Agreement has survived without serious breach.

vi) Gun Free Zones to Protect Youth and Stigmatize Guns in South Africa¹⁸

Gun Free South Africa, a South African NGO, launched the Gun Free Zone (GFZ) project in 1996 in order to reduce what was then one of the world's

highest firearm homicide rates. Recognising that gun violence was at epidemic levels in urban South Africa and that formal policing approaches were not working effectively, its explicit objective was to transform attitudes toward guns by creating a space in which weapons and ammunition were stigmatised. In other words, it sought to raise the economic and social *price* of weapons and thereby reduce *preferences* for acquisition and ownership. Some of these GFZs involve strict enforcement (as in the case of businesses and government offices) with coercive deterrents (e.g. police) while others rely on voluntary compulsion (as in the cases of many neighbourhoods and communities). The project also sought to strengthen social *resources* by nurturing and consolidating community networks, so as to provide alternatives to armed violence. Drawing on Section 140 of the Firearm Control Act (2000), Gun Free South Africa undertook a project to initiate "Firearm Free Zones" (FFZ) in 27 schools in five provinces. It gathered together school governing bodies, teachers and administrators, students and police in a dialogue to identify key problems and establish "Safety Teams" to implement appropriate policies. Though 17 schools eventually adopted FFZ policies, none has been officially declared an FFZ by the Ministry of Safety and Security.

vii) Research and Deterrence to Lower Youth Gang Violence in the USA¹⁹

The "Boston Gun Project," begun in 1995, is a problem-oriented policing initiative designed to confront spiralling youth homicide victimisation in Boston and serve as a test case for other inner city areas of the USA. Set up by the National Institute of Justice and Harvard University, a working group was established that included a combination of government and non-governmental stakeholders. "Operation Ceasefire" began in mid-1996 and entailed an innovative partnership between researchers and practitioners to assess the city's youth homicide problem

17. This example draws on Atwood and Muggah (2004). For a fuller description, see Robert Muggah (2004) "Diagnosing Demand: Assessing the Motivations and Means for Firearms Acquisition in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea," *Discussion Paper 2004/7*, Canberra: ANU-SSGM.

18. This example draws on Atwood and Muggah (2004). For a more complete analysis see Adèle Kirsten, Lephophoto Mashike, Knowledge Raji Matshediso, Jacklyn Cock (2005 – forthcoming) "Islands of Safety in a Sea of Guns: Gun Free Zones in Fothane, Diepkloof & Khayelitsha, Evaluating The Impact Of Gun Free Zones A Case Study Of Three Sites In South Africa," *Small Arms Survey*, Geneva.

19. This example draws on Atwood and Muggah (2004).

and implement an intervention designed to have a substantial near-term impact on the problem. Operation Ceasefire was based on a “pulling levers” deterrence strategy that focused criminal justice attention (e.g. increased policing, enforcement and improved legal processing) on a small number of chronically offending gang-involved youth. The deterrent effect of focused policing rapidly increased

the *price* of weapons acquisition while simultaneously reducing *preferences* through perceived improvements in community safety and security. An impact evaluation undertaken following Operation Ceasefire indicated that the project was associated with significant reductions in violence indicators, such as youth homicide victimization, “shots fired” calls for service, and the incidence of gun assaults in Boston.

3. Demand Priorities and the UN PoA

a) What does the UN PoA already include?

The UN PoA of July 2001 provides the basic multilateral consensus to that date on the direction for global action on small arms and light weapons reduction efforts. In the negotiations leading to its adoption, many states, agencies and NGOs had argued that the phrase “in all its aspects” in the title of the 2001 Conference underlined the importance of a range of issues that included controlling the demand for small arms. The clearest evidence for this view is the direct reference to demand in paragraph 7 of the Preamble, in which the states note their concern for the “close link between terrorism, organized crime, trafficking in drugs and precious minerals and the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons,” and stress “the urgency of international efforts and cooperation aimed at combating this trade simultaneously from both a *supply and demand perspective*” (emphasis added).²⁰

But demand issues figure more prominently in the PoA than this single paragraph suggests. Throughout the document’s operative paragraphs are threaded a host of references to the themes, actions and actors that are central to dealing effectively with small arms demand. These many indirect references²¹ include the PoA’s:

- note of concern for the ‘implications that poverty and underdevelopment may have for the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons’;
- focus on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants;
- emphasis on the special needs of children;
- recognition of the need to ‘promote dialogue and a culture of peace by encouraging . . . education and public awareness programmes’;
- recognition of the need to make ‘greater efforts to address problems related to human and sustainable development; and
- references to elements for which the shorthand is ‘security sector reform.’

These references indicate broad implicit acceptance by states of the need to address the demand dimension and, even in 2001, there was some understanding of the main elements of a demand agenda. Thus, it should be possible to establish continuity between already agreed on priorities and future, more explicit demand-focused processes.

Further, even though there were only general references made to demand-related steps with no specific international agenda laid out on demand, NGOs, the UN system and a number of states have continued to stress openly that a more holistic approach must shape the international agenda on small arms in the decade ahead, as has been shown above. A demand perspective is already evident in the work of many organizations not directly concerned with arms control. Evidence-based research is demonstrating the important relationship between demand and supply factors. A rich basis in practical experience exists for the development of a new consensus in the coming period pointing to a more fully integrated and holistic small arms agenda for action—at the local, national, regional and global levels.

b) Beyond the 2001 PoA: Policy Directions on Demand

The 2006 Review Conference on the PoA is the next major global opportunity to set a new global action agenda. It is not too early, therefore, to begin to highlight specific policy direction recommendations, based in actual experience, as a way of shaping not only the outcomes of the 2006 Review Conference but also approaches of the broad range of actors at different levels engaged in action to reduce the impact of armed violence. These ideas are as important to the development of NGO and agency planning, and to practical efforts at the national and regional levels, as they are to any future multilateral policy consensus. If experience is a guide, field programmes are likely to lead the way on integrating a unified demand-supply approach and broad multilateral

20. For a full discussion of demand issues and the UN PoA see Ernie Regehr (2004) ‘Reducing the Demand for Small Arms and Light Weapons: Priorities for the International Community,’ *Working Paper 04-2*, Project Ploughshares, Canada.

21. For a more complete list see David Jackman (2004) ‘Conflict Resolution and Lessening the Demand for Small Arms: Summary Report of a Research Seminar Organized by the Quaker United Nations Office (Geneva) and Africa Peace Forum (Nairobi).’ Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva, pp. 12–13.

political consensus will follow. The following list of recommendations, based on lessons learned, is aimed therefore, as much at informing practical, on-the-ground planning, as it is at higher-level policy discussions.

i) Strengthening Significant Groups

Gender Mainstreaming²²

- ◆ **Ensure that gender considerations are at the forefront of all peacebuilding programmes, especially DDR.** [Donors, multilateral and bilateral agencies and national governments]
- ◆ **Assure that data on female perceptions and needs are easily available and adequately considered in security planning.** Studies conducted as part of planning for DDR and other demand reduction programmes should include surveys of community perceptions of a wide variety of security indicators, and the results should be disaggregated to allow for an understanding of male and female responses. [Donors, multilateral and bilateral agencies and national governments]
- ◆ **Support more research and dialogue on how to actively and positively engage men in the gender discourse and adapt this material for use in DDR, peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive development programmes.** This includes breaking the link between gender violence and masculinity, fostering alternative modes of masculinity that men can adhere to, and ensuring that women's concerns are not pushed aside. [Donors, multilateral and bilateral agencies and national governments]
- ◆ **Provide sensitivity training to lawyers, police and judges about gender issues** with the goal of creating an atmosphere conducive to reports of sexual violence against females and males. [National and local governments]
- ◆ **Restrict the acquisition of small arms by those who commit gender-based violence and criminalize and punish gender-based violence.** Gender-based violence must be consistently subject to criminal penalties by well-informed and functioning police, judiciary and other agents of protection. [National and local governments]

22. These recommendations draw on Eli Mechanic (2004) "Why Gender Still Matters: Sexual Violence And The Need To Confront Militarized Masculinity, A Case Study of the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," Partnership Africa Canada, Ottawa, pp. 29–31, and Vanessa Farr (2004).

Youth

- ◆ **Encourage integrated, multi-dimensional programming for children and youth with a focus on reducing their involvement in armed groups.** A growing 'best practice' for successful field programmes aimed at young people is that they integrate content from the fields of economic and social development, education, and alternative non-violent conflict resolution, while minimizing the use of criminal justice and punitive methods. These programmes are conceived in the context of the community's understanding that it is confronting a shared involvement in a wider "culture of violence." [Multilateral and bilateral agencies, national governments and NGOs]
- ◆ **Provide informed, well-funded, long-term support to youth-focused work that is complementary to wider development goals.** The creation of sustainable youth-focused programming is often a major change in direction for a society. It requires consistent support by external funders as well as enlightened cooperation from local governments. Such programmes often can be integrated into the programmes of formal institutions such as schools, social service agencies, policing, and community conflict management structures. [Donors, multilateral and bilateral agencies and national governments]
- ◆ **Include specific programming that strengthens family units and better enables them to protect and nurture children.** Next to war, the family is the major influencing factor in whether young people do or do not become involved in armed groups. Crucially, supports to families should focus on the areas of parenting skills, reducing domestic violence and sexual abuse, and awareness of more balanced gender roles. Assuring the basic economic security of families is also a significant goal.

ii) Governance and Security Sector Reform

- ◆ **Contribute to protection of human rights.** The civilian demand for small arms is feasible only in a context where basic human rights are supported. There are many examples where violent conflict at the grassroots level is caused by state policies that fail to recognise the basic rights of local people. If citizens' rights to self-determination, land, resources and freedom are denied, then a likely result will be their recourse to power through the threat or use of weapons. [National and local governments]

- ◆ **Involve civil society and community stakeholders in reform efforts.** When reviewing and changing policy, laws and regulations on guns, the relevant levels of government should collaborate with civil society and targeted communities so that at implementation, the communities can feel ownership of the new legislation and will cooperate to ensure its effectiveness. [National and local governments]
- ◆ **Engage in security sector reform (SSR) efforts.** Improving policing and criminal justice systems is often an essential part of an effective control of weapons demand. The impact of the law depends on how effectively it is enforced. Often laws are not well enforced because local police/customs officers/border guards are ill informed about the law. [National and local governments]
- ◆ **Initiate and support, where applicable, community policing and “restorative justice” programmes.** Finding appropriate police staff to lead such a community policing programme is essential. Community policing is a major change in aims and activities and requires leadership that emphasizes communication, personal involvement, imagination and adaptability. [National and local governments and civil society]
- ◆ **Consider the creation of a community council that would directly advise any community policing programmes about conditions, needs, perceptions and possible solutions to security problems.** Such a council offers direct participation for residents in their own security situation and opens a space for direct communication and accountability that may otherwise be lacking in the local political system. [Governments and civil society]
- ◆ **Lessons from several regions suggest that demand can be influenced by interventions that adopt a combination of coercive punitive interventions and approaches that capitalize on voluntary normative compliance.**²³ Coercive initiatives (e.g. military/police, enforcement of penalties, etc.) and voluntary compliance (e.g. amnesties, reinforcement of customary controls, stigmatization, etc.) imply a range of potentially competing philosophies, investment requirements and logistical opportunities and constraints. [National and local governments]
- ◆ **Reconsider the practice of creating informal, armed civilian security groups.** In the absence of a functioning professional security sector, arming groups of civilians for informal policing has been shown to undermine security and to increase the

wider civilian demand for weapons. [National governments]

iii) Conflict Resolution and Peace Promotion

- ◆ **Explore indigenous methods of conflict management and collaborate with traditional leaders and structures,** particularly in situations where formal governmental capacities for such management are low or nonexistent. Such collaborations can include shared responsibilities between traditional community elders and formal governmental security structures, such as the formation of joint committees to curb demand for small arms. [Multilateral and bilateral agencies and national governments]
- ◆ **Support the development of programmes directed toward longer-term reconciliation processes, including, trauma healing, personal reflection, and citizenship programmes.** All of these are focused on the goal of affecting the self-image and identity of those people who have been exposed to violent conflict, abuse, injustice and ethnic discrimination – whether as victims, perpetrators or both. Such programmes are part of the necessary preparation of individuals and groups before involvement in inter-group reconciliation processes. [Multilateral and bilateral agencies and national governments]
- ◆ **Fund and support comprehensive peace education programmes as integral parts of DDR, development and arms control initiatives, as well as within peacebuilding programming.** Such programmes can lead toward a broader public awareness of peace alternatives and eventually toward an attitude change that favours non-violent conflict resolution. On a more practical level, they can also contribute directly to more immediate peacemaking goals. [International community]

iv) Post-war Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration

- ◆ **Devote adequate funding and resources to programmes for post-war reintegration of former combatants and to enable an effective and long-term collaboration of civil society on DDR goals.** The inadequate reintegration of ex-combatants

23. See analysis of programmes in Papua New Guinea, South Africa and the US in Atwood and Muggah (2004).

leads to the re-recruitment of fighters, banditry, destabilization of political and civil life and a pervasive instability that itself breeds an increasing demand for weapons. [Donors, multilateral and bilateral agencies]

- ◆ **Include the early involvement of civil society in the planning and implementation of all the stages of a peace operation.** Reintegration plans should be incorporated into peace agreements, so as to better attract the combatants to the eventual DDR process. Civil society at all its levels—international agencies, national, district and local organizations and even informal community groups—must have a major role to play if reintegration is to have any success. [Multilateral and bilateral agencies and national governments]
- ◆ **Consider involving former combatants—even those who fought each other—in peace promotion projects in post-war situations.** Such involvement has been shown to be symbolically powerful and inspiring. It assists in the positive reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life, contributes to practical efforts to find and collect landmines and other small arms, and provides motivated personnel to advocate and implement conflict prevention activity. [Multilateral and bilateral agencies and national governments]
- ◆ **Ensure that reintegration programmes are comprehensive, i.e., that they also take into account the special needs of demobilised women and child combatants and those who took non-combatant roles in armed groups.** [National and local governments, international agencies, NGOs]

v) Social and Economic Development

- ◆ **Begin integrating the demand discourse into the conceptualization and practical responses to violence and arms reduction.** For example, the OECD–DAC Guidelines and ODA prescriptions for bilateral donors should seek to integrate a holistic perspective in their consideration of the reduction of armed violence – one focusing on both the supply and demand for small arms and light weapons. Such an approach should be adopted in the planning, implementation and evaluation of SSR, DDR, weapons reduction programmes and other types of micro-disarmament initiatives. [Donors, multilateral and bilateral agencies]
- ◆ **Incorporate the curbing of small arms demand as part of overall frameworks for sustainable community development.** Hence, poverty alle-

viation and infrastructure development are also undertaken as preventive measures to reduce reasons for arms acquisition. [National and local government, donor agencies, NGOs]

- ◆ **Support multi-dimensional demand reduction programmes.** Programmes are more successful when they include combinations of measures related to development programming, such as youth programmes, infrastructure improvements, employment projects and education, along with security sector and judicial reform. In the experience of organizers, no single element on its own can be effective, but together they can respond to the system of issues that foster insecurity and gun violence in a community. [National and local government, donors, multilateral and bilateral agencies, NGOs]
- ◆ **Conduct preliminary research on the cultural, economic and political dynamics of each specific target community, and ensure that the results are disaggregated across the full range of actors.** The perceptions of security and the indicators chosen can vary widely among members of any target community. Options for research include surveys to understand the attitudes, wants and needs of community members, as well as participatory assessments to gauge the parameters of potential support, willingness to change, unforeseen obstacles and ownership of the process and outcomes.
- ◆ **Involve all stakeholders in a community dialogue on security.** Special attention should be paid to including youth, women, religious institutions, marginalized or conflicting groups, NGOs, business, professional associations, traditional leaders, and former combatants. Efforts should be made to include representatives across lines of class, ethnic identity, language and gender.

vi) Facilitating Steps Forward: Coordination and Research

Coordination [governments, multilateral agencies, NGOs, donor bodies]

- ◆ **Use National Focal Points and National Commissions on small arms to provide a locus for consultation and collaborative planning with civil society on demand programmes.** Civil society organizations have developed considerable capacity for planning multi-dimensional programmes in conflict management, development and small arms control. They could partner more effectively

with government in this work if there were institutional avenues available.

- ◆ **Document and publicize examples of collaborative conflict management projects involving civil society and government at local and district levels.** With wider awareness and promotion this creative cooperative experience could be extended to conflict response at all levels.
- ◆ **Support the ‘mapping’ of programmes at all levels—local, district, national, cross-border—that focus on conflict management and small arms control.** This would provide an important foundation for the development of coordinated national programmes to resolve conflicts and lessen demand for weapons.
- ◆ **Create or support forums, networks, training events, manual and other programming that explicitly links conflict, development and arms issues.** In particular, donors and relevant civil society organizations should organize a variety of ongoing forums or events where common problems, opportunities and collaborative action can be addressed. In addition, international and regional NGOs should include small arms issues, including demand perspectives, into any training manuals or events intended to foster links between conflict and development programming.
- ◆ **Support programmes with clear, unambiguous and attainable targets.** Successful demand reduction interventions have generally worked because they have such targets. While there is no standard time-frame for successful demand reduction

projects, many have articulated clear, short- and medium-term benchmarks on key indicators such as firearm-related homicide, robbery and victimisation rates. Though changing attitudes and behaviours is a long-term process, it is vital to establish short-term objectives so as to allow for the generation of ‘demonstration effects’ and positive multipliers. Moreover, objectives must be clear, indicators measurable and surveillance and evaluation systems adequately installed and functional (and financed).²⁴

Research [Donor agencies]

- ◆ **Sponsor demand-related research on small arms.** This should focus on the ways demand is constructed, the dynamic interplay of prices, resources and preferences, and entry-points for demand reduction in particular contexts.
- ◆ **Sponsor evaluation programmes that look critically at conflict-related programmes and assess their effect on small arms demand in relevant communities.** Funds should be made available to civil society programmes specifically to enable organizers to collect data in support of such research.
- ◆ **Sponsor specific studies examining gender aspects of small arms use and violence.** In addition to the inclusion of gender aspects in ongoing surveys of small arms proliferation and misuse, specific studies are needed in areas such as the roles of men and women in armed conflict, cultural norms and intimate gender-based violence, as well as masculinity and violence.

24. See Atwood and Muggah (2004).

4. Further Information on Small Arms Demand

Workshop Reports by QUNO and Partners

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Mechanic, Eli, (2004) "Why Gender Still Matters: Sexual Violence and the Need to Confront Militarized Masculinity, A Case Study Of The Conflict In The Democratic Republic Of The Congo," Partnership Africa Canada, Ottawa, www.pacweb.org

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Muggah, Robert (2005 – forthcoming), "Diagnosing Demand: Means and Motivations for Small Arms in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands," Discussion Paper 7, Canberra: ANU-SSGM.

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Weiss, Taya (2004) "Guns in the Borderlands: Reducing the Demand for Small Arms." ISS Monograph No. 95, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria.

Web Sites

The following Internet sites all carry policy and programme information related to small arms demand issues:

- Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue: www.hdc.org
- Institute for Security Studies: www.iss.co.za
- Quaker United Nations Office: www.geneva.quno.info
- Small Arms Survey: www.smallarmssurvey.org
- UN Development Programme: www.undp.org
- World Health Organization: www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence